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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CANYON COUNTRY REALTY, 
COLDWELL BANKER/ARCHES 
REALTY, GEORGE COPELAND, 
and SHARON COPELAND, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
vs. 
NELSON MOYLE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 980239-CA 
Oral Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This case involves two cases which arise out of the same claimed contract. 
Copeland v. Movie was an action by the buyers, claiming damages resulting from the 
seller's refusal to sell the property. Canyon Country Realty v. Moyle was an action by the 
real estate agents seeking a commission on the sale. Portions of the cases were decided 
jointly by the trial court, and the cases were consolidated by this Court for the appeal. 
A. Canyon Country Realty v. Moyle. 
The trial court entered a judgment on March 17, 1998, awarding the real estate 
agents a commission, plus interest and attorney fees. The judgment stated that the attorney 
fees would be determined later. (R. 102B-103B.) An Order determining the amount of 
attorney fees was entered May 6, 1998. (R. 126B-127B.) Moyle filed a Notice of Appeal 
from both orders on May 18, 1998. (R. 128B-129B.) 
With respect to the May 6, 1998, Order, the Notice of Appeal was filed within 
thirty days of the entry of the Order and was timely. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). The Order 
determined all claims with respect to all parties and was a final order. Utah R. Civ. P. 
54(b). The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 
(1996). The Supreme Court poured the case over to the Court of Appeals on July 16, 
1998. (R. 147B.) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j) (1996). 
The judgment entered March 17, 1998, decided all issues except the amount of 
attorney fees. That judgment was arguably final under Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 
927-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), which was decided nearly two months after entry of the 
judgment. Based on that decision, Moyle filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal. 
(R. 132B-133B.) Computed from the March 17, 1998, judgment, the last day to appeal 
would normally have been April 16, 1998. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Thirty days (Utah R. 
App. P. 4(e)) from that date was May 16, 1998, a Saturday. The motion for extension of 
time was filed on Monday, May 18, 1998, which was the next business day. Utah R. 
App. P. 22(a). The motion was, therefore, timely under Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The trial court granted the motion for extension of time by Order 
entered June 26, 1998. (R. 145B-146B.) The order extended the time for filing the notice 
of appeal to May 18, 1998, the same date the notice of appeal was filed. 
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B. Copeland v. Moyle. 
The judgment appealed from was entered August 5, 1998. (R. 234A-235A.) 
Moyle1 s Notice of Appeal was filed fewer than thirty days later, on September 3, 1998. 
(R. 236A-237A.) The Notice of Appeal was timely. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). The Utah 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0 (1996). The case 
was poured over to the Court of Appeals on September 29, 1998. (R. 249A.) The Court 
of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did Copelands fail to present admissible proof of damages where their expert 
gave only an estimate of a fair listing price for the real estate and associated business 
combined and there was no evidence of the value of the real estate alone? The trial court's 
factual findings will be reversed only if they are against the clear weight of the evidence, 
thus making them clearly erroneous. Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corp. v. 
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co.. 909 P.2d 225, 228 (Utah 1996) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Moyle objected to and moved to strike the testimony of the 
Copelands1 expert on the ground, among others, that the expert testified concerning the 
value of a turnkey business, whereas the court had held the contract conveyed only the real 
estate plus certain specified additional assets not including the business. (Tr.1 52.) Moyle 
renewed the motion to strike after the expert testified that his valuation was also based on 
the business including bicycles and other sports equipment. (Id. at p. 55.) The trial court 
*The transcript was indexed as R. 251. 
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denied the motion to strike. (Id. at p. 56.) Moyle renewed the argument in closing 
arguments (Id. at p. 98), and in objections to the Findings of Fact. (R. 220A-222A.) 
2. Was testimony of a fair or optimum listing price relevant and admissible to 
prove fair market value of real property? Review is generally for abuse of discretion. 
Pearce v. Wistisen. 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985). Moyle objected to the testimony 
concerning the fair offering price. (Tr. 40.) 
3. Where a real estate agent was prohibited by statute from testifying concerning 
value, did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony? "It is within the 
discretion of the trial court to determine the suitability of expert testimony in a case and 
the qualifications of the proposed expert." Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co.. 781 P.2d 445, 
447 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 
Moyle objected to the testimony from Copelands1 valuation expert on the grounds, among 
others, that the expert was not an appraiser, had not prepared an appraisal report, and had 
not performed a formal market analysis on the property. (Tr. pp. 40-41, 43.) 
4. Where a party "accepted" an offer only after modifying it, did the "accep-
tance" constitute a counter-offer which could be withdrawn at anytime before formal 
acceptance? This issue was decided by summary judgment and is reviewed for 
correctness. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 
(Utah 1989). This was raised in Moylefs motions for summary judgment and their 
supporting memoranda filed in each case. (R. 151A-179A; 98B-99B; 67B-88B.) The 
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argument was renewed during trial in response to evidence that the real estate agent 
considered the excluded equipment to be part of the business. (Tr. pp. 52, 55.) 
5. Did the trial court err in awarding attorney fees incurred in obtaining and 
defending a default judgment, where the default judgment was set aside? Whether attorney 
fees are recoverable is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. A. K.& R. 
Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction. 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999). This court also reviews for correctness whether the findings are sufficient to 
support the award, i.e., whether the party has adequately categorized the time and fees 
among the different claims. Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). Calculation 
of the actual amount of the attorney fee is in the sound discretion of the trial court and is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 
1988). This was raised in Moyle's Objection to Attorney's Fees, which asserted that there 
was no legal basis for an award of fees. (R. 130A.) 
6. Does the award of a fixed judgment rate of interest violate Utah Code Ann. 
§ 15-1-4(2) (1996)? This is a question of statutory interpretation which is reviewed for 
correctness. Brown v. David K. Richards & Co.. 978 P.2d 470, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999): see also Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). This 
issue is not raised below because it was based on a case decided April 8, 1999, while this 
matter was pending on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has previously held, however, 
that interest accrues at the statutory rate even where the judgment does not so provide, 
Dairy Distributors. Inc. v. Local Union 976.16 Utah 2d 85, 396 P.2d 47, 48 (1964), and 
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that a failure to specify interest is a clerical error. Id. Accord Fitzgerald v. Critchfield. 
744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (pre-judgment interest is allowed as a matter of 
right even when not specifically pleaded). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2b-2, 61-2b-3, and 61-2b-9 are reproduced in the Appendix. 
These statutes are part of the Utah Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certification 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2b-l to -41. There have been minor changes in the cited 
sections subsequent to the date of trial, but none that the affect the provisions at issue here. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil action. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The Copeland case was filed 
June 16, 1997, and sought specific performance of a Real Estate Purchase Contract 
between the Copelands and Nelson Moyle. A default judgment was initially entered 
against Nelson Moyle but later set aside. Additional details concerning that default 
judgment are presented in Point V of this brief. 
On August 20, 1997, Copelands filed a Motion to Amend Measure of Damages. 
The document gave notice that Copelands sought an award of damages based on the 
claimed benefit of their bargain and no longer sought specific performance. 
The Canyon Country Realty case was filed July 28, 1997, and sought a judgment 
against Nelson Moyle for real estate commissions based on the contract alleged in the 
Copeland case. (R. 1B-14B.) 
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On February 2, 1998, the Canyon Country Realty plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment supported by a memorandum and affidavits, 
motion sought ° A . ; ..* ^ were entitled to 
a c o m n . t Purchase Contiaa. 
Moyle responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment and, asserted that his 
purported acceptance of the Real Estate Purchase Contract was a u u _ , - . • , 
that the counter-offer was rescmck,: ' • en, ^ >» uiciciore 
unenloiuiable |W n7K XXR JI ( sequenth O^G im, OAII motions for summary 
judgment in both cases assv,w»fc _ argument. (R. 151A-177A, 178A 179A, 98B-
99B.) 
The motions for summary judgment in both cases were argued before the trial court 
i Hi" "i ^fleeting the oral arguments arc noi indexed bin 
appear on the left-hand side of each file.) The court concluded that Moyle1 s "acceptance" 
was binding and no; d counter-offer, because the items he excluded from the cunii in i \\ i» 
not expressly part oi the initial otlei ml" u H i t , i 11 i l {'> H \y*\\ 7(HA, k. 
• • Based on the summary judgment ruling, the court entered judgment in favor of the 
Ciiii)j±. Coumr_ K-1 . plaintiffs foi A cnir.n 
attorney fee ' ) 
yC w a s | rie(j on Jui> I J , *^ -^^ . v_ " • 
entry ' " At the hearing, Copelands waived all theories of recovery except the 
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benefit of the bargain (difference between the sale price and the fair market value). (Tr. 
pp. 76, 78.) The trial court found the value of the property to be $235,000.00, and 
awarded judgment for Copelands of $50,000.00. (Tr. 100.) Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 225A-228A) and a Judgment (R. 234A-235A) were entered 
August 5, 1998. Execution on the judgment has been stayed pending the appeal. (R. 
245A-246A.) 
The appeals in the Copeland case and the Canyon Country Realty case were 
consolidated by order entered December 15, 1998. 
C. Statement of Facts. In May, 1995, Nelson Moyle purchased the Canyon 
Country Bed & Breakfast, which was an existing bed and breakfast business in Moab, 
Utah. (Tr. 14.) In September, 1996, after his wife had filed for divorce, Moyle listed the 
property for sale through Canyon Country Realty. (R. 30B-33B.) The listing price was 
$298,000.00. (R. 34B.) The listing agent was Randy Day, a salesman with Canyon 
Country Realty. (Id.) 
On January 7, 1997, George and Sharon Copeland, then living in Steamboat 
Springs, Colorado, presented an offer to purchase the property for $185,000.00. (R. 35B-
4IB.) Copelands were represented in making the offer by Kelly Stetler of Coldwell 
Banker/Arches Realty. 
On January 13, 1997, Nelson Moyle signed the offer in the space provided for 
acceptance. (R. 40B.) Moyle also, however, added the following to the list of excluded 
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aragraph 1.2 of'the contra.. All skis, water & snow, bikes, kayaks and other 
personal sports equipment not included "PR 11 IP; aflat IK d In 1 Hidings in Appends " 
Moyle's agent, kiiiidy M>M ill111 >MIUU tin JILJU miriiniil In (> v\\\ SUlin, 
Copelar. - M * ' he Copelands to review Moyle's changes and deii'i mine 
if they were acceptable. (R. 78B, 81B-82B.) George Copeland informed Stetler that 
Copelands had no problem, with the changes, fid ol, however, sign any 
document reflecting their acceptanc 
Lain nil I In* saiih' ' Mu7 Neison Mo>k contacted his agent and 
orally rescinded the "acceptance. ^_. allowed .\ "" written counter-offer 
changing the sales price to $255,000.00. f™ * opelands believed iliiii the 
$185,000.00 c i^ , had been act 4;. «, Uw\ »>"ij m i l i h - l ' " i>« pi <h' V?SS,000.00 
c • followed up with a letter on February 6, 1997, 
confirming that he did not consider the contract to be binding, (R, RIB ) 
Although they knew by at least February 6, 199J , 111 a I Moylc did nol intend h nil 
the property, Copelands ihcreattei sold llintii u-suk-iiu HI Sd/ajiibiiitl Spring i \>lnMdu 
111 in I ( III "imr |nh'i | IIIIIII iiiisniJ nil in in o t h e r h o m e in Moaf ) , a n d m o v e d t o M o a b w i t h t h e i n t e n t o f 
starting a new bed and breakfast. (Ti. 62-63, 70 j 
At the trial on July IV 19Q8. Copelands presented evidence through Randy Uayn 
Moyle's real estate ager ,< .^ ..e spropeil) li-id In VM marketed it. iii imiitn " lied ,md 
hreaklasl bust HI s^« with the ruling on summai y judgment, the trial 
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court nonetheless held that only the items specifically listed on the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract were included in the sale, and that the sale did not include the business. (Tr. 35.) 
Copelands presented evidence of the value of the property only through Randy Day. 
Mr. Day was a licensed real estate agent but was not a licensed appraiser. (Tr. 23, 40.) 
Mr. Day had previously owned and operated Canyon Country Property Services, which 
booked rooms at all the bed and breakfast businesses and motels in Moab. Through that 
business, he had visited every bed and breakfast in town and was familiar with them. (Tr. 
46.) He testified that in the course of his real estate business, he had sometimes prepared 
market analyses for properties. (Tr. 37.) He did not perform a formal market analysis for 
this property (Tr. 43) but had informally considered what an appropriate price might be 
in order to determine whether to list the property for Moyle. (Tr. 44.) Over the objection 
of Moyle, Day testified: "I thought the optimum opinion was around a $25,000 range. 
It's where we would come in and then make a fair settlement on the B&B and I think that 
would have been a fair price at the time." (Tr. 49.) Day further testified that the value 
he had given was the value for a turnkey business. (Tr. 51.) He testified that he 
understood the business to include everything except for some skis on the wall and some 
ski boots and a couple of pictures. (Tr. 50.) He testified that the telephone line and the 
phone number were an important part of the business. (Tr. 54-55.) 
Moyle testified that the telephone line used in the Canyon Country Bed & Breakfast 
was owned by Canyon Country Bed & Breakfast, L.L.C., and was also used by a tour 
company owned by Moyle. (Tr. 83, 86, 89.) George Copeland, in rebuttal testimony, 
10 
conceded that the telephone line was not included as part of the purchase agreement. ' 
91.) 
No testimony was presented regarding that 
Nelson Moyle leslifi il that the telephone hm- i.s otrenidv crucial to the bed and breakfast 
business, and "it isn t a business without the phone lines. (' I  "i 87 ) He further explained 
that the advertisements for the business are placed once a year prior to the start of the 
tourist season, and that it is important I ,> ii.ii i \ 1111 idephoik IIMIIIIK'I1 iiiii ill ist1 mh mi? inig 
p n l ' l l U I 1 'II I i w I iy! ' ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is an appeal from two cases, both, of which arise mi i mil I \ •mm UcJ Klate 
] that no binding contract existed and 
refused to sell the proper . x ne first case (Cany ui. C ) lie ally v. Moyle) was brought 
by the real estate ag; snts to recover a claimed commission. The second case 'r^pc* -. •- \ 
Moyle) was brought by the buyers to recover the claimed benchl ol I lie; baigam 
There \vd in
 kiifoi -uNr COIIIMI i 10 M II iiiii | IIIII i | "iiiii'v Although Moyle signed the 
Copelands' olic± to purchase in me place indicated for acceptance, he do so only a fin 
changing the tenm- r -?< "~ A- qualified acceptance is not an acceptance, h*f n 
counteroffer 'Movie's acceptance/counteroffer was .. . „. * i4 
Copelands ILii, ru«b, iL'ivlm.1 u • ilnnrabk >i -• *« nouns 
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for commissions and the Copelands' claim for damages accordingly fail for lack of a 
predicate contract. 
Even if the contract was enforceable, the Copelands did not present admissible 
evidence of damages. The only testimony of value was given by Randy Day, one of the 
real estate agents. He was not a licensed appraiser, and was statutorily prohibited from 
testifying concerning the value of the real property. In addition, the value estimate he gave 
was for the business, whereas the Copelands admitted they did not contract to buy the 
business, but only the real property and certain additional assets specified in the contract. 
There was no evidence of the value of the assets purchased by Copelands. 
The trial court took the supposed value of the business and made a reduction to 
arrive at a value for the assets purchased. There was no evidentiary basis whatsoever for 
the amount of the reduction. Finally, the value testimony given was not fair market value 
of the business, but fair listing price. There simply was no admissible evidence to support 
the trial court's finding of damages. 
Two additional rulings of the trial court were erroneous. The trial court granted 
Copelands judgment for attorney fees as part of a default judgment, after the default 
judgment had been set aside. There was no legal basis for the attorney fee award. Finally, 
the interest rate specified on the judgments should be corrected to comply with the statute 
as interpreted by this Court. 
12 
ARGUMENT 
COPELANDS
 P R E S E N T E D
 N O EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE 
OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE CONTRACT, 
AND THUS FAILED TO PRESENT ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES. 
The on] \ i*\ idence of value presented to the u iat , ourf was throujin N.;. 
is not and did is* *. , >ai;>. u ;>, ah appra:* . and 
breakfast buauiv.^  m court concluded that Copelani red 
t< purchaau winj m*, real estate anc Ljiuim specified personal pioperty, and did not 
contract to purchase the business Among the items not nit luded were die iclcphoiu linn s 
and numbers \% .,.,.*. were pul.. , Hi were the means 
( .* . u v pciaikfe presented no evidence of the value of 
those telephone lines (which value would need to lie deducted from,, the value of the 
business), and therefore did not present any evidence ol the value oi the real estate and 
specified assets described in the LOIIIUH 1 
11 liii i1 uiii'i mil (iii ii.kjit',;., n linT-i ,„i, .„ iTiiloi' has bi eached a land sale contract is the 
market value 01 the property at aiu LIIU. oT th. n? ich les^ -he , ontract price tr the 
vendee." Bunnell v. Bills, 13 ITtah ?d ^ ^ P V. 
case further held tna* to warr^ ^ »ertv there must 
* ,ib as win warrant a finding cl \alu^ ^m* 
reasonable certainty." In Bunnell, the vendor had agreed to sell the Alta motel and certain 
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personal property to Bunnell for $175,000.00. The vendor later breached the contract and 
sold the motel to Willardson Motel Lodges for $180,000.00. The trial court awarded 
Bunnell damages of $5,000.00, the difference between the two contract prices, but the 
Supreme Court reversed. The court noted that the two contracts were on different payment 
terms, and that the Willardson contract included additional personal property. The court 
concluded: 
The other supporting evidence for a $180,000 market 
value that plaintiff claims to exist, such as plaintiff's opinion 
that the value of the Alta would increase, and implications 
from the entire record, does not contain the degree of certainty 
which a reasonably accurate ascertainment of market value 
would require. This is especially true where additional 
evidence was readily available for a more accurate valuation. 
Damages cannot be found from mere speculative and 
conjectural evidence, and therefore the trial court1 s finding that 
Stevens1 breach damaged plaintiff in the amount of $5,000 
cannot be supported by the evidence and cannot be upheld. 
368 P.2d at 602. 
If the $180,000 actual sale price in Bunnell was too speculative and conjectural to 
support a damage award, it is even more certain that the admittedly "soft"2 estimate of a 
listing price range given by Mr. Day for the entire business is too uncertain to prove fair 
market value of the real estate. 
Other Utah cases support this requirement of certainty. In Atkin Wright & Miles 
v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.. 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), the court 
2Copelands' counsel acknowledged in closing arguments that Copelands' evidence of value 
was soft: "And the Court has good evidence, I will concede that it is not a hard number, it's a little 
soft, but I think there is a very good basis." (Tr. 96.) 
14 
held 11 ml "[w]hile the standard for determining the amount of damages is not so exacting 
as the standard for proving the fact of damages, *u~-~ still must :•, ,JVIL, .j.a 
above speculation and pn iv ides a reasonaui. . * - *•»''•' * - sumaie 
ol damage i "', V ? 1 i" ' '-' Hi- . Mint held that where the issue was whether the 
plaintiff had lost net income, proof of loss of gross income was insufficient. Similarly, in 
Nelson v. Trujillo. 657 ¥,?J TW. 735 (Utah H8/:i, ilie court; .u ^ • •. t 
evidence to support, an awar., or lost earnings w -• • >ure 
guessw nl loi (."'Jjiii.iliiii!1; rurmiif's reasonably certain to be lost in the future. tr-j ** 2d 
at 735 (citation omitted). 
The following points establish that the trial court: did noi have adequate evidence of 
the fair market value of the husmc<" i *'**• " '»< ' ^ ' i i i u , ' ; \ aiguemlo lli:i( llinv was 
i.-. ,•->=« - •-• the trial "-:•••?:-•„ dial the value of the business was 
55750.000.00. j uocs not follow that the court's derivative finding of the value of the real 
estate and personal property was supported by the evidence. The trial on "i"' look Hie 
$250,000.00 v?1vr ..- ,. business and .i nmiplelely aibilrary lolw I1 . , 
lil'"i ( M N ) . O O I I P m, Kiiiiiiiil l«i f Ihi I'iin I thul llif I ' l / l ephone l i n e s a n d o t h e r p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y u s e d 
in Ilie business were not included in the sale. The trial court had no basis, except pi, ire 
guesswork or speculation, for fixing the amount of the reduction. 
Two Utah Supreme Court cases c< * 
the value . manufacture ~ , : 
where idenre to support it. In Utah Department of Transportation v. Jones. 
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694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984), the jury awarded $76,675.00 in compensation for condem-
nation of the defendant* s property. Three experts had testified at trial. One defense expert 
placed the combined value of the real estate taken plus the severance damages to the 
remaining real estate at $141,000.00. Another defense expert placed the combined total 
at $166,806.00. The plaintiffs expert placed the combined total at $90,589.00, but 
testified that severance damages had been offset by special benefits to the defendants so 
that the net total value of the taking was $44,275.00. On appeal, the Supreme Court held 
that there were no offsetting benefits to justify reducing the value to $44,275.00. The 
Supreme Court concluded, therefore, that the lowest combined estimate of value was 
$90,589.00. The Court held: "The jury award of $76,675.00 was lower than any of [the 
appraisal estimates] and thus is not supported by the evidence. The verdict must, 
therefore, not be permitted to stand." 
A similar issue was presented in State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). Carter 
had been charged with third-degree theft for stealing a camera in Salt Lake County. Third-
degree theft requires that the amount stolen exceed $250.00. Two experts testified at trial. 
The prosecution's expert, from Price, Utah, testified that the value of the equipment was 
$490.00. He also testified, however, that he worked exclusively in Price and was familiar 
only with camera values in Price. The defense expert, a Salt Lake dealer, testified that the 
stolen equipment was worth $177.00. The court held: 
The value of the used camera equipment was not a fact 
within the common knowledge of the jury. Since the only 
evidence of the value of the camera equipment at the place it 
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was stolen was the testimony of Mr Schmidt, the only value 
supported by the evidence was the figure he gave, $177.00. 
Cross examination of Mr. Schmidt disclosed no factual basis 
for a higher estimate. The State cites no case, and we have 
been unable to find any ourselves, which allows a jury to 
disregard expert testimony as to the fair market value of stolen 
property and fix a higher value when there is no basis in the 
evidence properly before the court to justify that value. Of 
course, a jury is free to disregard expert testimony in whole or 
in part, but see State i ' Boyd, Utah 692 P.2d 769 (1984), and 
it may also discount the value of property estimated by an 
expert. In this case, however, the issue is not the right to 
disregard an expert's testimony, but whether there was any 
admissible evidence to support a finding that the value of the 
camera exceeded $250.00. There was none. 
707 P.2d at 662-63. 
In this cast.\ there similarly wa~ nr evidence to support *he Ha l court's arbitrary 
redi . vaiue gi•, . » ^ L ! L ^ :H.S, 
< Terence between the iau umijcet value oi the 
assets purchased and the contract price. Copelands presented no evidence of the value of 
the assets purchased. Even if Randy Day was competent to testify concerning the value 
of the business, that evidence was inn I JI Imissihlc ill Ilk qui, sin in i Il till • .iluc nil Ilk1 assets 
liiiinritiised i ihn ii >,i !i Il ill ii! ill Imsinrvi iicluded the telephone line and telephone 
number, and that those were an important part of the business. Copelands admitted that 
they did not purchase the telephone line and number ° — w e v opelands iaileu IO present 
admissible evidence on the rein 'anl issue, Ilk \ aim1 v w a; ; w 
f r i ' l i in ' ( f»''»Ni,| •iiiiiii iiiiiM l l a m a s ii"1!,1' <f «" f,| h'" >,',\'rr,si id. 
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POINT n 
THE TESTIMONY CONCERNING FAIR OR OPTIMUM LISTING VALUE 
WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
Mr. Day's testimony is inadmissible because he failed to expressly testify 
concerning fair market value of the business.3 At most, Mr. Day testified that 
$250,000.00 was the "optimum opinion" and that it would have been a "fair price." (Tr. 
49.) He did not testify that $250,000.00 was the fair market value. The distinction is 
critical, as illustrated by the Utah Supreme Court case of Mallinckrodt v. Salt Lake 
County, 983 P.2d 566 (Utah 1999). The Mallinckrodts presented an appraisal giving an 
opinion of the "current minimum market value" of the subject property. The Supreme 
Court held that testimony was inadmissible on the issue of fair market value: 
The Mallinckrodts' evidence of value is flawed. That 
evidence consists of an unsigned appraisal setting forth a 
current minimum market value, not fair market value, which 
is the required standard. The Mallinckrodts argue that their 
evidence of current minimum market value equates to fair 
market value because a certified appraiser made the valuation. 
That does not follow. Fair market value is statutorily defined 
as "the amount at which property which change hands between 
a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowl-
edge of the relevant facts." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(8). 
Certainly a certified appraiser must be aware that the term 
"fair market value" is a legal term of art that provides the 
determinative standard in cases such as this. Whatever 
"current minimum market value" is, and neither the 
3Point I of this brief argues that testimony of the fair market value of the business was 
irrelevant and therefore inadmissible, because the relevant issue was the fair market value 
of the real property and assets listed in the contract. This Point II argues that even if fair 
market value of the business were relevant, Mr. Day's testimony did not fit the bill. 
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Mallinckrodts nor their appraiser has explained it, it does not 
appear to be equivalent to fair market value. 
983 P.2d at 569. 
A review of Randy Day's testimony illustrates that he was concerned only with 
determining an optimum price at which he would be willing to list the property. For 
example, Mr. Day testified as follows: 
Q [by Mr. Russell] Is it important to you to have 
some kind of estimate on the value of real estate when you are 
involved particularly with a sale? 
A [Randy Day] It certainly is. 
Q And do you, as a practical matter, attempt to 
make it that sort of evaluation on property that you are 
involved in as an agent for a sale? 
A I do. 
Q Did you do that with this property? 
A I suggested what I thought would be an optimum 
price before we listed but we were a little higher than what I 
thought was an optimum price and we could prove as an 
income property, yeah. 
Q When you talk about optimum price, are you 
talking about price supported by what you know about the 
market? 
A By the basic market, yes. 
Q What was that price? 
(Tr. 39-40.) 
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After objections to foundation and relevance, Mr. Day ultimately gave his opinion 
as follows: 
Q What is it? 
A I though the optimum opinion was around a 
$250,000 range. It's where we would come in and then make 
a fair settlement on the B&B and I think that would have been 
a fair price at the time. . . . 
(Tr. 49.) 
In response to cross-examination, Mr. Day further explained his opinion as follows: 
Q [by Mr. Slaugh] What did you mean by a 
$250,000 range and then a make fair settlement for the B&B, 
can you explain that? 
A Yeah, when we were discussing it, Nelson and 
I were discussing it, he said he wanted to stay just under 
$300,000 and that's what we did and I said, "Well, we realize 
that, you know, we are a little high," he said, "Well, it's 
easier to come down than it is to go up," and I agreed, and 
he's the owner so he can set his price anywhere he wants and 
I told him that I thought the $250,000 would be where we get 
a fair market value. That would be a fair price for the 
property. 
(Tr. 50.) 
Although Mr. Day used the phrase "fair market value" once in response to cross-
examination, it is clear from the overall tenor of his testimony that he was saying the same 
as he testified on direct, that $250,000 was an optimum listing price.4 It is clear that he 
^he testimony on cross-examination is also deficient because it does not purport to testify 
concerning the fair market value, but only to report what Mr. Day told Mr. Moyle prior to listing 
the property. The only testimony of value given by Mr. Day was that given on direct, that the 
optimum listing price was $250,000. 
20 
was not purporting to give an expert opinion as to the actual price at which the property 
would sell. In fact, he clarified his "fair market value" statement to explain that $250,000 
would be a "fair price" for the property. A fair price for listing purposes is not the same 
as fair market value. 
POINT in 
COPELANDS' EXPERT WAS NOT A LICENSED REAL 
ESTATE APPRAISER AND WAS PROHIBITED BY 
STATUTE FROM TESTIFYING CONCERNING 
THE VALUE OF REAL PROPERTY. 
The only evidence concerning value in this case was given by Randy Day, who was 
the listing real estate agent for the property. He was not a certified appraiser. Although 
questions concerning the qualifications of an expert witness are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, Butler. Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline, 909 P.2d 225, 233 
(Utah 1995), the necessary qualifications for an individual testifying concerning value of 
real property are specified by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-3 and § 61-2b-9 provide 
that it is unlawful to prepare an appraisal report without first being registered or certified 
as an appraiser. 
The statute defines "appraisal report" as "any communication, written or oral, of 
an appraisal." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-2 (as enacted 1996; amendments in 1998 did not 
affect the quoted provision). This statute further provides that" [t]he testimony of a person 
relating to the person's analyses, conclusions, or opinions concerning identified real estate 
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or identified real property is considered to be an oral appraisal report." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-2b-2(3)(c). Oral testimony in court is, therefore, an "appraisal report" as defined in 
the statute. Section 61-2b-3 prohibits a person not licensed as an appraiser from giving 
such a report. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-3 has been addressed in one Utah Supreme Court decision, 
Utah Association of Counties v. Tax Commission, 895 P.2d 825 (Utah 1995). In that 
case, the plaintiffs claimed an appraiser could not testify concerning value of a business 
because he was not registered or certified under § 61-2b-3. The court held the prohibition 
did not apply in that case because the appraiser did not testify concerning the value "of 
specified interest in, or aspects of, identified real estate or identified real property." The 
court held the statute did not apply because " [n]o real estate was identified" in the appraisal 
report. 895 P.2d at 830. In this case, in contrast, the primary focus of Mr. Dayfs 
"appraisal" was a specifically identified parcel of real estate. Section 61-2b-3 prohibited 
him from testifying as to the value of that property. 
Randy Day was not a licensed appraiser, and the trial court abused its discretion in 
permitting him to testify concerning the value of real property. In addition, the testimony 
given did not state the fair market value of the property, but only stated what Mr. Day 
considered to be a fair price at which he would list the business. Finally, Mr. Day's 
testimony only addressed the entire business, not the assets described in the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract. There was, therefore, no admissible evidence on the question of the 
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fair market value of the assets purchased, and the judgment of the trial court must be 
reversed. 
POINT IV 
MOYLES "ACCEPTANCE" WAS LEGALLY A COUNTER-OFFER 
BECAUSE IT PROPOSED ADDITIONAL TERMS. 
The trial court decided, on summary judgment, that Moyle accepted Copelands1 
offer to purchase Moylefs property. The documents show that Moyle checked a box 
indicating his acceptance of the offer, but only after changing the offer, by interlineation, 
to exclude personal property which Moyle testified was an integral part of the bed and 
breakfast business. 
Whether a contract existed is a question of law. Herm Hughes & Sons. Inc. v. 
Ouintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The law requires an offer and an 
unqualified acceptance. A purported acceptance which adds additional terms is not an 
acceptance, but a counter-offer. 
This rule is illustrated by Sproul v. Parks. 116 Utah 368, 210 P.2d 436 (1949), 
which also involved a plaintiff suing to recover a real estate commission. The defendant 
sellers had offered to sell property on terms; the plaintiff real estate agent produced a 
buyer who was willing to pay cash. When the sellers would not agree to the cash sale, the 
real estate agent modified the offer to conform to the terms contained in the listing 
contract. The sellers then signed the offer, but added, "This deal is acceptable provided 
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the down payment is $8,500.00." There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the 
buyer orally agreed to the down payment, but there clearly was no written acceptance. 
The trial court found there was no contract, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. The 
opinion treats the sellers1 "acceptance" as a counter-offer, and affirmed judgment against 
the real estate agent because, among other reasons, the acceptance/counter-offer was not 
accepted in writing by the buyer during the listing period. 
Of similar effect is Benya v. Stevens and Thompson Paper Co.. 468 A.2d 929 (Vt. 
1983). The plaintiff made an offer to buy timber land. The defendants attorney signed 
the offer to indicate acceptance but, as in the instant case, made some changes by 
interlineation. The plaintiff later attempted to enforce the agreement consistent with the 
interlineated terms, and the trial court held the agreement was binding. The Vermont 
Supreme Court reversed, stating: 
The law relative to contract formation has long been 
well settled in Vermont and elsewhere. For an acceptance of 
an offer to be valid, it must substantially comply with the 
terms of the offer. An acceptance that modifies or includes 
new terms is not an acceptance of the original offer; it is a 
counteroffer by the offeree that must be accepted or rejected 
by the original offeror. The offeror's acceptance of the 
offeree's counteroffer may be accomplished either expressly or 
by conduct. 
468 A.2d at 931 (citations omitted). 
This principle is expressed in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (1981) as 
follows: 
24 
A reply to an offer which purports to accept it but is 
conditional on the offeror's assent to terms additional to or 
different from those offered is not an acceptance but is a 
counter-offer. 
The illustration to that section states: 
A makes an offer to B, and B in terms accepts but adds, 
"This acceptance is not effective unless prompt 
acknowledgment is made of receipt of this letter." There is no 
contract, but a counter-offer. 
It is clear from the depositions of the Copelands and their real estate agent that they 
did not understand the additional terms interlineated by Moyle to be automatically binding 
on them. Rather, they understood that the terms would not be binding on them without 
their consent. Kelly Stetler reviewed the additions with the Copelands to determine if the 
additions would be acceptable to them. Such actions are consistent with the fact that the 
"acceptance" was, under the law, a counter-offer which was binding only if accepted. 
In addition, Randy Day, Moyle1 s real estate agent, testified at trial that he 
understood that the property had been listed as a going business, and that the business 
included some bicycles and other equipment that Moyle used as part of the business. (Tr. 
55.) Moyle1 s affidavit submitted in opposition to the summary judgment motions 
confirmed that the excluded items had been used as part of the bed and breakfast business. 
(R. 187A-188A, 100B-101B.) 
Taking all reasonable inferences from this testimony, it is clear that the excluded 
items were material. They were items which were arguably part of the transaction, and 
which were part of the income stream for the business. Moyle1 s exclusion of those items 
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from the sale created a counter-offer, which was not binding because it was not accepted 
by the Copelands prior to the time Moyle withdrew it. Summary judgment on this issue 
was improper. 
POINT V 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES FOR WORK IN 
OBTAINING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST 
MOYLE WAS ERROR. 
The summons and complaint in the Copeland case were served on April 
Williamson, who was then residing at the bed and breakfast property. (R. 21 A.) When 
Moyle did not respond to the summons and complaint, Copelands obtained a Default 
Judgment and Notice of Hearing to Enter Damages, which was entered July 14, 1997. (R. 
25A-26A.) 
At the time the summons and complaint were served on April Williamson, Moyle 
had not resided at the bed and breakfast location for several months. He later visited Moab 
and was informed of the pendency of the action. He learned of the action on July 16, 
1997, and filed his motion to set aside the judgment 13 days later, on July 29, 1997. (R. 
44A-45A, 53A-54A.) 
At the time he filed his motion to set aside the judgment, Moyle also filed a motion 
for continuance of the evidentiary hearing under the prior default judgment, which was 
then set for July 30, 1997. (R. 42A.) The minute entry for the hearing reflects that Moyle 
appeared personally, but his attorney was not able to appear. The court proceeded to hear 
evidence. The court ordered Moyle to specifically perform the contract within one month 
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and awarded plaintiffs their reasonable attorney fees. The court did not award any other 
damages. (Minute Entry, left side of record A file.) 
On August 19, 1997, the trial court entered a ruling setting aside the default 
judgment. (R. 100A-101 A.) The following day, August 20, 1997, but apparently before 
they had received the court's ruling, plaintiffs filed their Motion to Amend Measure of 
Damages. (R. 102A-114A.) This motion sought to reject the specific performance 
previously ordered by the court and asked instead for an award of damages for the benefit 
of plaintiffs' bargain. On the same day, plaintiffs filed an Affidavit Regarding Attorney 
Fees. (R. 115A-117A.) An amended affidavit was filed September 3, 1997, seeking 
$2,731.25 in fees and $120.00 in costs. (R. 123A-126A.) 
Moyle objected to the claimed fees on the ground that there was no basis for an 
award of attorney fees in the action. (R. 130A.) On January 7, 1998, the court entered 
its Ruling Regarding Attorneys' Fees. (R. 143A.) The ruling did not comment on the 
legal basis for an award of fees, but only stated that the requested amount was reasonable. 
A formal judgment awarding the requested fees of $2,731.25 was entered on January 29, 
1998. (R. 147A-148A.) 
It is important to note the state of the record at the time the trial court entered its 
January 29, 1998, judgment for attorney fees. The default judgment had been previously 
set aside. (R. 100A-101 A.) Moyle had answered the plaintiffs' complaint and demanded 
a jury trial. (R. 127A-129A.) No other proceedings had occurred subsequent to the 
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answer. At the time of the attorney fee judgment, there was no ruling still in force which 
granted plaintiffs any right to attorney fees. 
"Generally, attorney fees in Utah are awarded only as a matter of right under a 
contract or statute." Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). At the time of the 
award here, no contract had been enforced by the court, and there was no statute which 
granted a right to attorney fees. There was no legal right to fees at the time of the 
judgment. 
Even viewed in hindsight, after the trial court held that the contract was enforce-
able, the January 29, 1998, attorney fee award cannot stand. A review of the affidavit 
reveals that most of the time (14.75 hours, or 68% of the total) was spent in obtaining and 
defending the default judgment. This effort was unsuccessful and no fees should have been 
awarded for it, particularly where the grounds for relief from the judgment, defective 
service of process and lack of actual notice, were relatively clear. 
The law regarding an award of attorney fees was recently summarized by the Utah 
Supreme Court as follows: 
An award of attorney fees must be based on the 
evidence and supported by findings of fact. . . . In this 
regard,, we have mandated that a party seeking fees must 
allocate its fee request according to its underlying claims. . . 
. Indeed, the party must categorize the time and fees expended 
for (1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement 
to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would 
have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been 
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to 
attorney fees. . . . 
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The trial court, in turn, must make an independent 
evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees in light 
of the parties1 evidentiary submissions. . . . 
The trial court should also document its evaluation of 
the requested fees1 reasonableness through findings of fact. . 
. . These findings should mirror the requesting party's 
allocation of fees per claims and parties and should support 
any award issued. . . . They enable the reviewing court to 
make an independent review of the fee award, and whether the 
findings are sufficient to support the award is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. . . . 
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
The January 29, 1998, judgment does not comply with these requirements. There 
is no discussion as to why any attorney fees should be awarded. There are no findings as 
to why the entire amount requested was awarded, even though most of the fees related to 
an unsuccessful default judgment. The January 29, 1998, judgment should be reversed. 
POINT VI 
THE JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE 
FOR INTEREST AT THE STATUTORY RATE. 
The judgments entered in this action each state that they will accrue interest at 
7.468 %. This was the interest rate in effect at the time each judgment was entered. Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-4(2) (1996). The statute does not state whether the rate in effect at the 
time of the judgment continues for the life of the judgment. The administrative office of 
the courts has stated its opinion that the rate in effect at the time of the judgment continues 
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through the life of the judgment. (Memorandum from AOC, attached in Appendix.) 
Moyle, accordingly, did not object to the interest rate stated in the judgments. 
In Brown v. David K. Richards & Co.. 978 P.2d 470, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), 
the Utah Court of Appeals considered this question. The court recognized that it was an 
issue of first impression. In that case, the question was whether the prior 12% rate in 
effect at the time of the judgment should continue through the life of the judgment. The 
court held that "when the interest rate is changed by statute, the rate of interest on a 
judgment is also changed." (Id (citation and internal quotation marks and brackets 
omitted).) 
The judgment interest rate has changed since entry of the judgments at issue here, 
and will likely change in the future. A summary of the interest rates, based on information 
obtained from the administrative office of the courts, appears in the Appendix. 
Moyle contends that each of the judgments appealed from should be reversed. In 
the event any of the judgments remain in force, each such judgment should be amended 
to provide that interest accrues at a floating rate of interest, based on the judgment rate in 
effect for each year. 
CONCLUSION 
No evidence supports the trial court's finding that the value of the contract property 
was $235,000. The real estate agent's testimony that the business should be listed at 
$250,000 was (1) irrelevant to the issue of the value of the contract property, (2) not the 
same as fair market value, and (3) prohibited by statute. Even if the evidence were 
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admissible, there was no evidence to support the arbitrary adjustment from the supposed 
value of the business to reach a value for the contract property. Copelands failed to 
present admissible evidence of damages. The judgment for Copelands must be reversed. 
The judgment in favor of the real estate agents is based on an offer which was not 
accepted. An acceptance with qualifications is not an acceptance. The summary 
judgments for the real estate agents and Copelands must be reversed, and summary 
judgment granted to Moyle. 
The attorney fee award based on the default judgment must be reversed because 
there was no order to support granting the judgment. 
Any judgments not reversed should be amended to provide for interest at the 
statutory rate. 
DATED this Y^ day of November, 1999. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: /j 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Ruling on Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment, Copeland v. Movie, entered August 
19, 1997 (R. 100A-101A) 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
FILED AUG 1 9 1997 1 ^ 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE & SHARON COPELAND, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NELSON D. MOYLE, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Case No. 970700077 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant has moved to set aside the default and 
default judgment in this case on the grounds that 1) he was 
never properly served, 2) his neglect is excusable. Plaintiffs 
object, arguing that defendant was properly served, his neglect 
is not excusable but instead part of a pattern of manipulation, 
and defendant has no legitimate defense. 
The evidence presented by plaintiff does not persuade 
the Court that the place at which the summons and complaint were 
delivered was defendants usual place of abode. Moreover, the 
Court does not consider it likely that defendant would have 
ignored the summons at the risk of being defaulted, had he 
actually been aware of the summons. Finally, the defenses which 
defendant apparently intends to assert are not transparently 
without merit. The motion is accordingly granted. 
COPELAND V. MOYLE 
RULING ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Counsel for defendant should submit a formal order 
pursuant to Rule 4-504. This ruling does not affect the 
temporary restraining order and injunction previously ordered by 
the Court. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 1997. 
Lyle R. Anderson, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on August 19, 1997, I mailed/hand 
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Natasha Hawley 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
818 Oak Street 
Moab, UT 84532 
Douglas Gubler 
Attorney for Defendant 
4659 S. Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
£&£ / 
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APPENDIX "B" 
Judgment, Copeland v. Moyle. entered 
January 29, 1998 (R.147A-148A) 
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER 
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB#2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
394 West 400 North 
Moab.Utah 84532 SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT Grand County, Utah 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT""® JAN 2 9 1998 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
GEORGE & SHARON 
COPELAND, 
Plaintiffs, 
NELSON MOYLE. 
Defendant. 
Judgment 
Civil No. 9707-77 
Judge Anderson 
The Court having previously issued a ruling awarding plaintiffs' counsel 
attorneys' fees and costs on prior proceedings. The Court having since reviewed 
the affidavit of plaintiffs' counsel regarding fes and costs, as well as defendant's 
response, and finding the amount requested by plaintiffs' counsel to have been 
reasonably and necessarily incurred, 
JUDGMENT, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant is hereby 
entered in the amount of $2,731.25, which amount shall accrue interest at the rate 
of 7.468% until paid. 
Dated t h i s ^ j d a y of ""J^ i iy f l rO* , 1998. 
^ ^ ^ BY THE COURT 
NORABLE LYLE ANDERSON 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form & Content 
Douglas Gubler 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Mailing Certificate 
The foregoing JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to defendant's 
counsel DOUGLAS GUBLER, 4659 Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
on January 8,1998. 
APPENDIX "C" 
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, 
Canyon Country Realty v. Movie, entered 
March 17, 1998 (R. 104B-116B) 
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER 
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
394 West 400 North 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (801)259-7321 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
FILED MAR 1 ? 1998 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
CANYON COUNTRY REALTY, 
and COLDWELL 
BANKER/ARCHES REALTY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NELSON MOYLE, 
Defendant. 
Findings of Fact & 
Conclusions of Law 
Civil No. 9707-96 
Judge Anderson 
On March 3, 1997, the Court heard cross-motions for summary judgment The parties 
were both present represented by coxmsel of record. After considering the record, pleadings and 
argument of the respective parties, the Court hereby makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 12, 1996, the defendant entered a Listing Agreement & Agency 
Disclosure with Canyon Country Realty (Randy Day, Broker and Agent) to sell certain property 
located at 590 North 500 West in Moab, Grand County, Utah. A copy of the Listing Agreement is 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference. 
2. On January 7, 1997, George and Sharon Copeland submitted a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract for the property through their agent Kelly Stelter of Coldwell Banker/Arches 
Realty. 
3. The offer was submitted to defendant on January 13, 1997, and accepted in 
writing. A copy of the Real Estate Purchase Contract is attached hereto and incorporated by reference. 
4. In accepting the offer, the defendant added the following language to Section 1.2 
(Excluded Items) on the Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
"All skis, water & snow, bikes, kayaks and other personal sports 
equipment not included/' 
5. The Court finds that language to be superfluous and of no impact to the accepted 
offer since the Buyers had not offered to purchase the excepted items. (This Finding applies even 
if, as defendant alleged, some or all of the excepted equipment had been used for rental by 
customers of defendant's bed & breakfast) 
6. The defendant also inserted his name in Section 5 (Confirmation of Agency 
Disclosure) of the Real Estate Purchase Contract 
7. The Court finds this addition was merely disclosure as required by law of the 
fact that defendant was, at all relevant times, a licensed real estate agent, and that such disclosure 
did not effect the substantive rights or obligations of the Buyers, Seller or real estate agents 
involved in the transaction. 
8. Following his acceptance of the Copelands' offer, defendant submitted an 
"Addendum No. 1" which purported to increase the price of the property from $185,000 to 
$255,000. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes and enters the 
following, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's acceptance of the Copelands7 purchase offer as set forth above 
constitutes a valid and binding contract for the purchase of the real estate. 
2. Upon acceptance of the offer, the plaintiff real estate agents were entitled to a 
sales commission pursuant to the terms of the Listing Agreement 
3. Defendant's exclusion of personal property that the buyers had not offered to 
purchase did not constitute a Counteroffer, as a matter of law. 
4. Defendant's agency did not impact the contact that had been created by his 
acceptance of the Copelands' purchase offer as a matter of law. 
5. Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs7 Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
GRANTED, and defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED. 
6. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys7 fees and costs incurred in the 
action pursuant to Section 8 of the Listing Agreement & Agency Disclosure. 
Dated this _1998. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to Form & Content 
Leslie Slaugh 
Attorney for the Defendant 
1 H i LISTING AGREEMENT & AGENCY D^CLOSURE 
REALTOR- (PART A) S;;OYTV;;™ 
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT 
READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING 
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into by and between £~ a-^^y**^ Q-&-<us-*tZy &^i&£^S 
(the "Company") and A/^,J!L~^ / i ^ ^ y £ ^ (the "Seller") 
1. TERM OF LISTING. The Seller hereby grants the Company, including / ^ g g / x x ^ £/Cc^/' (the 
"Seller's Agent") as the authorized agent for the Company, for the period of / f> months starting on the 
date of execution of this Listing Agreement, and ending at 5:00 P.M. on the / ^U day of J^JLA>~ 199 _2 , 
(the "Listing Period"), the Exclusive Rigjit to Sell, Lease, or Exchange certain real property owned by the Seller, 
described as: £T7c M C#6 ^ (the 
"Property"), at the price and terms stated on the attached board/association property data information form, or at such 
other price and terms to which the Seller may agree in writing. The Seller's Agent agrees to use reasonable efforts to 
find a buyer or tenant for the Property. 
2. BROKERAGE FEE. If, during the Listing Period, the Company, the Seller's Agent, the Seller, another real estate 
agent, or anyone else locates a party who is ready, willing and able to buy, lease, or exchange (collectively referred to 
as "acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at the listing price and terms stated on the attached board/association 
property data information form, or any other price and terms to which the Seller may agree in writing, the Seller agrees 
to pay to the Company a broker fee in the amount of $ ^fT or £> % of such acquisition price. The 
brokerage fee, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the Seller and the Company, shall be due and payable on the 
date of closing of the acquisition of the Property. If a ready, willing, and able buyer is located as provided in this 
section above, and the Seller refuses to contract or to close, the Seller shall be obligated to immediately pay to the 
Company the brokerage fee listed above. The Company is authorized to share the brokerage fee with another 
brokerage participating in any transaction arising out of this Listing Agreement. 
3. EXTENSION PERIOD. If within ( ^— months after the termination or expiration of this Listing Agreement, the 
Property is acquired by any party to whom the Property was offered or shown by the Company, the Seller's Agent, the 
Seller, or another real estate agent during the Listing Period, the Seller agrees to pay to the Company the brokerage 
fee stated in Section 2 unless the Seller is obligated to pay a brokerage fee on such acquisition to another brokerage 
pursuant to another valid sales agency contract entered into after the expiration or termination date of this Listing 
Agreement. 
4. SELLER WARRANTIES/DISCLOSURES. The Seller warrants to the Company that the individual(s)/entity listed 
above as the "Seller" represent all of the record owners of the Property. The Seller warrants that it has marketable title 
and an established right to sell, lease, or exchange the Property. The Seller agrees to execute the necessary 
documents of conveyance and to prorate general taxes, insurance, rents, interest and other expenses affecting the 
Property to the agreed date of possession. The Seller agrees to furnish the buyer at closing good and marketable title 
with a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price. In the event the acquisition includes personal 
property, the Seller agrees to sign a Bill of Sale with warranties as to title to the personal property. The Seller agrees 
to fully inform the Seller's Agent regarding the Seller's knowledge of the condition of the Property. Upon signing of this 
Listing Agreement, the Seller agrees to personally complete and sign a Seller's property condition disclosure 
statement. The Seller agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Seller's Agent and the Company against any claims 
which may arise from: (i) the Seller's providing incorrect or inaccurate information regarding the Property; or (ii) the 
Seller's failure to disclose material information regarding the Property, including, but not limited to, the condition of all 
appliances, heating, plumbing, and electrical fixtures and equipment, sewer, and moisture or other problems in the roof 
or foundation, and the location of property lines. 
5. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS. The following is a brief but very important explanation regarding the nature of agency 
relationships between the Seller, the buyer, the Company and the real estate agents involved in a sale of the Property. 
/ 
broker is referred to as a Princif. _>roker or a Branch Broker (if the broker^ nas a branch office) The broker is 
responsible for operation of the brokerage and for the professional conduct of all agents 
5.2 Right of Agents to Represent Seller and/or Buyer An agent may represent through the 
brokerage, a seller who wants to sell property or a buyer who wants to buy property On occasion, an agent will 
represent both seller and buyer in the same transaction When an agent represents a seller, the agent is a "Seller's 
Agent', when representing a buyer, the agent is a "Buyer's Agent", and when representing both seller and buyer, the 
agent is a "Limited Agent" 
5.3 Requirement of Written Agreement. To represent a seller, a buyer, or both, a written agreement is 
required Except as provided below, the Principal/Branch Broker also represents whomever the agent represents, and 
regardless of whom the agent represents, the agent owes a duty of honesty and fair dealing to all parties to the 
transaction 
5 4 Seller's Agent. A Seller's Agent works to assist the seller in locating a buyer and in negotiating a 
transaction suitable to the sellers specific needs A Sellers Agent has fiduciary duties to the seller which include 
loyalty full disclosure, confidentiality diligence, obedience reasonable care, and holding safe monies entrusted to the 
agent 
5.5 Buyer's Agent. A Buyer's Agent works to assist the buyer in locating and negotiating the acquisition of 
a property suitable to that buyer's specific needs A Buyer s Agent has the same fiduciary duties to the buyer that the 
Seller s Agent has to the Seller 
5.6 Limited Agent. A Limited Agent represents both seller and buyer in the same transaction and works to 
assist in negotiating a mutually acceptable transaction A Limited Agent has fiduciary duties to both seller and buyer 
However, those duties are "limited" because the agent cannot provide to both parties undivided loyalty and full 
disclosure of all information known to the agent For this reason, a Limited Agent must remain neutral in the 
representation of a seller and buyer, and may not disclose to either party information likely to weaken the bargaining 
position of the other, such as, the highest price the buyer will pay or the lowest price the seller will accept A Limited 
Agent must, however, disclose to both parties material information known to the Limited Agent regarding a defect in 
the Property and/or the ability of each party to fulfill agreed upon obligations. 
5.7 In-House Sale. If the buyer for the Seller's Property is also represented by an agent in the Company, that 
transaction is commonly referred to as an "In-House Sale" Most In-House Sales involve limited agency because 
seller and buyer are represented by one or more agents in the Company In-House Sales can occur in any of the 
following ways 
(a) In-House Sale/One Agent. In this situation there is only one agent in the Company involved in 
the transaction - that agent represents both Seller and buyer Therefore, the Seller's Agent and the 
Principal/Branch Broker are required to (i) act as Limited Agents, and (u) inform the Seller 
regarding the limited agency when a buyer, who is also represented by the Seller's Agent, first 
expresses an interest in the Property 
(b) In-House Sale/Two Agents. In this situation there are two different agents in the Company 
involved in the transaction One represents the Seller - one represents the buyer, and the 
Principal/Branch Broker acts as a Limited Agent In such a transaction, the Seller's Agent is required 
to inform the Seller regarding the limited agency of the Principal/Branch Broker when a buyer 
represented by another agent in the Company, first expresses an interest in the Property 
(c) In-House Sale/All Agents. In this situation all agents in the Company, including the 
Principal/Branch Broker, represent both the Seller and the buyer as Limited Agents In such a 
transaction, the Seller's Agent is required to inform the Seller regarding the limited agency when a 
buyer also represented by an agent in the Company, first expresses an interest in the Property 
5.8 Conflicts with the In-House Sale. There are conflicts associated with an In-House Sale, for example 
agents affiliated with the Company discuss with each other the needs of their respective buyers or sellers Such 
discussions could inadvertently compromise the confidentiality of ipf6rmation provided to those agents For that 
reason the Company has policies designed to protect the confidentiality of discussions between agents and access 
to confidential client and transaction files ^^ij/7/ S 
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relationship with the Company 
[ ] 
Seller's 
Initials 
[ 1 
Seller's 
Initials 
(a) [K] ° n e Agent in the Company. The Sellers Agent and the Principal/Branch Broker 
will represent the Seller 
(b) [ ] All Agents in the Company. All agents in the Company, including the Principal/Branch 
Broker will represent the Seller 
If 5 9(a) is checked, the Seller authorizes the Seller's Agent or the Principal/Branch Broker to appoint another agent in 
the Company to also represent the Seller, in the event the Seller's Agent or the Principal/Branch Broker will be 
unavailable to service the Property 
5.10 Authorization for Limited Agency. The Seller is advised that the Seller is not required to accept a 
limited agency situation in the Company However, it is the business practice of the Company to participate in In-House 
Sales In the event the In-House Sale involves limited agency, the Seller agrees to the following (Seller initial 
applicable box) 
[ ] 
Seller's 
Initials 
[ ] 
Seller's 
Initials 
[ ] 
Seller's 
Initials 
(a) [)(] In-House Sale/One Agent. The Seller's Agent and the Principal/Branch 
Broker are authorized to represent both the Seller and a prospective 
buyer as Limited Agents 
(b) [ ] In-House Sale/Two Agents. The Seller's Agent will exclusively represent 
the Seller, another agent in the Company will exclusively represent 
the buyer, and the Principal/Branch Broker will act as a Limited Agent 
(c) [ ] In-House Sale/All Agents. (Only applicable if 5 9(b) has been selected) 
All agents in the Company, including the Principal/Branch Broker, 
will represent both the Seller and the buyer as Limited Agents 
6. PROFESSIONAL ADVICE. The Company and the Seller's Agent are trained in the marketing of real estate 
Neither the Company, nor the Seller's Agent are trained to provide the Seller or any prospective buyer with legal or tax 
advice, or with technical advice regarding the physical condition of the Property If the Seller desires advice 
regarding (i) legal or tax matters, (u) the physical condition of the Property, or (in) this Listing Agreement, the Seller's 
Agent and the Company STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE SELLER OBTAIN SUCH INDEPENDENT ADVICE 
7. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after a closing, related to this 
Listing Agreement [ ] SHALL [XJ MAY first be submitted to mediation If the parties agree to mediation, the 
dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties Each party 
agrees to bear its own costs of mediation If mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this 
Listing Agreement shall apply 
8. ATTORNEY FEES. Except as provided in Section 7, in case of the employment of an attorney in any matter 
arising out of this Listing Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the other party all costs and 
attorney fees, whether the matter is resolved through court action or otherwise If, through no fault of the Company, 
any litigation arises out of the Seller's employment of the Company under this Listing Agreement (whether before or 
after a closing), the Seller agrees to indemnify the Company and the Seller's Agent from all costs and attorney fees 
incurred by the Company and/or the Seller's Agent in pursuing and/or defending such action 
9. INFORMATION RELEASE. The Company is authorized to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or 
other party holding a lien or interest on the Property 
10. MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE. The Company is authorized and instructed to offer this Property through the 
Multiple Listing Service of the X&^CUVT^ k JXJ*IS*^&*ZS<JU^K board/association of 
REALTORS® The Company is further authorized to disclose after closing the final terms and sales price of the 
Property 
11. KEY BOX. The Company [ 313 [>0 , s N 0 T authorized and instructed to have a key box installed on the Property 
The Company [ ] IS [ K ] IS NOT authorized to have a key to the Property The Company \X\ IS [ ] IS NOT 
authorized to hold 'Open Houses' at the Property The Seller acknowledges that the Company nas discussed with the 
Seller the safeguarding of personal property and valuables located within the property The Seller further acknowledges 
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UAR Form 8 
]cSeller's Initials Date 
m 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT t£r 
TWt i t t >«9«fly beefing contract Ot*h Itw nxjuifvi mi e*Ut» l l t * n * « » to u n tM» form. Buy*r tod £•*}*<-, how^^r, may atjnw k> «JUr or <toi«U 
lt» provision* or to u»* • dTtftgru form, tf you d#ilr« >*gal or t»* *t*v*e«, c*c*"»«ut your attorney of tax advtmor 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
d befowt a/id hereby divers to the Brokerage/as earnest Mono* 
BuyerL 
describe v* rage 
shall be depos/ted in ace 
Received by: 
UdC 
otters topuftflaR'the Property 
f/CQt)*^ rtie form of 
st 
ey, the amount of $_ 
which, upon Acceptance of this otter by ait pefrties (as defined in Section 23). 
.(Date) 
Number 
-i^-Mf*, Brokerage: r^^A^^^t^^A /M^A^y^ ^ fcW%5phona 
, OFFER TO PURCHASE ^ 
1. PROPERTY 
also descnb9d as 
City of /#&> 
V<rr^^ /&*¥* f
 t/&U 
County of. £&* State of Utah (me •Property'). 
1.1 Includad Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale incJudes the lollowtng items rf presently attached to the Property, 
plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater, built-in appliances; light fixtures and bulbs; 
bathroom ffxtures: curtains, graperies and rc>dz\ window and door scions, slum; Juuis* en id WHKJUYHJ, window blinds; awnings; 
installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets; automatic garage door opener and 
accompanying transmitter(s); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items Sftaji alsc be included in tttj sale and 
conveyed under beparjiie Bill of Sale wfth wa^antles as ictltla. ^^^' /f^A^r^JZ^^^^ JL^trf^Jr* 
dxclud 1.2 Bxclufled Items. The following items are e ed from this safe: s9tS<-%*^* - ^ ^ ^ J ^ T ^ ,J 
1,3 Water Rights 
^a-^ -c irv5yT 
nduded in this sale:. 
1.4 Survey. A surv^map 9 w6 Propefty certified 6y a licensed surveyor f J WILL ^£] WILL NOT be prepared. The 
Property comers [pQ WILL! [ J WILL NOT be marked by survey stakqs set by a licensed surveyor or engineering company. 
The cost of the applicable (tims checked above will be: [ ] paid by B u y * ( ] potd by Svlfer [ft mhared equally by Buyer 
and S a i l * [ ] Other frptclfy), 
For additional terms, see attached Survey Addendum if applicable. 
2. PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price for the Property is S r^jf 5, 6"&Ty 
2.1 Me 
7 sc 
, d of Payment. The Purchase Pnce will oe paid as tallows: 
' /Deo/* 
4f.t (a) Earnest Monty Deposit. Under cartnln conditions described In thU Contract, THIS 
, DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE, 
(b) Now Loan. Buyar agrees to apply for a new loan as provWea in Section 2.3. Buyer will apply (or 
' one or more of the following loans: ( ) CONVENTIONAL { ] FHA [ ] VA 
[ ] OTHER (specify) . 
\\ an FHWV t\ toar. apples, see attached FHA/VA Loan Wtierrdum. 
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then chock below and aive detailr 
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS 
s'/gteagj 
I /^^CO> 
(c) Loan Assumption (sec attached Assumption Addendum if applicable) 
Ag\ fe l ler Financing (^ee atlachpd Seller Fir^ncing Addendum if applicable) 
P ^ ( S f T 3 t h e r (specify) ' 
£j/^ (f> B«lcno« Q1 Purchase Pr\ci In Cash /it Setttewent (<^ S i : 
PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (t) 
PH^C I of 6 pnp.v*s Seller's Initiu I*K!IB/M-
5C~ 
Dale 
'/7A7 
- - .. . ^^ tw ^/w. o p.o^/oiiy. INC.* ouuc i a^^iz^L^ iuii 
responsibility for any loss or dar ., that might result from the use of the ke, Keybox from any source whatsoever 
and agrees to hold the Company and the Seller's Agent harmless from any and all liability as a result of having the key 
to the Property and having the keybox installed on the Property. If a tenant occupies the Property on other than a 
"nightly rental basis", the tenant agrees to the installation of a keybox and joins in the waiver and release of the Seller's 
Agent and the Company as provided above. 
(Tenant Signature) (Date) 
12. SIGNAGE. The Company is authorized to place an appropriate sign on the Property. 
13. ATTACHMENT. The provisions of the attached board/association property data information form are 
incorporated by this reference. In order to complete the property data information form the Seller's Agent may provide 
the Seller with a courtesy estimate of the square footage of the Property. As an estimate the square footage figure 
shall not be relied upon by the Seller or the buyer in their decision to purchase/sell the Property. 
14. EARNEST MONEY DEPOSITS. As part of an offer to purchase the Property, a potential buyer will typically 
deliver an Earnest Money Deposit to the brokerage which assists the buyer in preparing that offer. The Company is 
hereby authorized and directed to accept on behalf of the Seller, and to hold in its trust account, any Earnest Money 
Deposit delivered to the Company by a potential buyer. 
15. PRELIMINARY TITLE REPORT. In order to: (i) identify potential title concerns; and (ii) avoid possible delays in 
marketing the Property, the Company recommends that the Seller, upon signing this Listing Agreement, authorize the 
Company to order a Preliminary Title Report ("PR") on the Property from 
(Name of Title Company). The Seller: [ ] AUTHORIZES [ X ] DOES NOT AUTHORIZE the Company to 
immediately order a PR and [ ] ENCLOSES [\£] DOES NOT ENCLOSE a check for the cost of the same. 
16. EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY. The Property will be presented in compliance with Federal, State and local 
anti-discrimination laws. 
17. FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENT. Facsimile transmission of a signed copy of this Listing Agreement, and 
retransmission of any signed facsimile transmission, shall be the same as delivery of an original. If this transaction 
involves multiple owners this Listing Agreement may be executed in counterparts. 
18. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This Listing Agreement, including the Seller's property condition disclosure form, and the 
attached board/association property data information form, contains the entire agreement between the parties relating 
to the subject-matter of this Listing Agreement. This Listing Agreement may not be modified or amended except in 
(Seller's Signature) (Address/Phone) (Date) 
(Seller's Signature) (Address/Phone) (Date) 
THIS LISTING AGREEMENT shall become effective only upon acceptance by the Company as evidenced by its 
signature below. 
ACCEPTED by the Company 
by by: 
(Authorized Seller's Agent) (Date) (Principal/Branch Broker) (Date) 
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WHITE: Broker CANARY: Seller's Agent PINK: Seller 
2.2 Financing Condition, (ohook applicable box) 
(a) ft<] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Qroperty IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the appucaoic !oan(s) 
referenced in Section 2.1(b) or (r) ;th« "Loan") This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition • 
(b) [ ) Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for e loan. Section 2 3 
doasfiot kpply 
2.3 Application fOf Loan. 
(a) Buyer's duties. No later than the Application Deadline referenced in Soctron 24(a) Buyer shall apply for the Loan. 
"Loan Application" occurs only when BLyer has (i) completed, signed, and delrvered to the tender (the "Lender") 
the inuiai loan appl<catipn and documentation iequ»red by the Lendor: and (u) pajd all loan application lees as 
/squired by the Lender *B jycr agrees to diligently work to ootajn the Loan. Buyer will promptly orovide the Lender 
witn any addltlqna! documtniUilion as ream red by tho Lender 
(b) Procedure If Loan Application Is denied, it buyer receives written irolio* from the Lender that the Lender does 
not approve me Loan (a 'loan Denial"), Buyer shall, no later than three calendar days thereafter provide a copy to 
Seller. Buyer or Seller may. within three calendar days aftor Seller s receipt of such notice, cancel thrs Contract by 
providing wrme-n notice to the other party in the event o< a cancellation under this Section 2.3(D): (i) if the Loan 
Dental was 'ecerved by Suyor on or before the Earnest Money forfeiture Deadline referenced in Section 24(d), the 
Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; (h) rf the Loan Denial was received Dy Buyer after the Earnest 
Money Forfeiture Deadline, Buyer agrees to forfeit, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy, the 
Earnest Money as liquidated damages A failure to cancel as prnvirifKi in this Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on 
the Financing Condition set forth in Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section of 
this Contract slSiali be governed by such other provisions. 
2.4 Appraisal o* Property. Buyers obligation to purchase the Propeny [ ] IS £Xf IS NOT conditioned upon the 
Property appraising for not less than tha Purchase Pnce If the appraisal condition appiies and the Property appraises for less 
than the Purcnaso Price. Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Setter no later than rvee calendar days 
after Buyer's receipt of nqtice of the appraised value. In the event ot such cancellation, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be 
released to Buyer, regardless of whether such cancellation is before or aftor the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline A failure 
to cancel as provided m this Section 2.4 shall be deemed a waiver of the appraisal condition by Buyer. 
I 
3. SETTLEMENT AND (CLOSING. Settlement shall take place on or before the Settlement Deadline referenced m Section 
24(e). •Settlement" shallioccur only when all of the following have been completed: (a) Buyer and Setter have signed and 
defrered to each other or io the escrow/dosing office all documents required by this Contract, by the Lender, by wrnten escrow 
inqfriicttnas nr hy appficafife law. to) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these documents (except for the proceeds 
of any new loan) hava been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/rmsing ottice in tne form or coiiectao or cieared fund*, 
and (c) any monws requ^ed to be paid by Seller under these documents have been doiivered by Sette' to Buyer or to the 
escrow/closing office In thfe form ot collected or deared funds. Seller and Buyer shall eadi pay on*-haff (i/?) of the fee charged 
by the escrow/closing office for its services in the settlement/dosing process. Taxes and assessments tor the current year, 
rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated al Settlement as set toah in this Section. Tenant doposits 
{induding, but not limited jo, security deposits, cleaning deposits and prt?p<*kJ r«uU) shall be paid or credited by Seller to 8uyor 
at Settlement Prorations jset torth m this Section snaU be made as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced m Section 24(e). 
unttss otherwise agreed tp in writing by the parties. Such wnting could mciuae the settlement statement. The transaction win 
be considered closed w'rjen Settlement has been completed, and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the 
proceeds of any newioa/n have ^on delivered by the Lender to Seller ui tu ih* oscrow/'docing office; and (M; the applicable 
Closing documents have;been recorded in the office otthe county recorder. The actions described m parts (i) and (i<) ot the 
preceding sentence shall'be completed within four calendar days of Settlement 
Sellfrr shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within- r)y ^ 2 . hours [ ] days after Closing; 4. POSSESSION, 
[ 1 Other (specify) 
5. CONFIRMATION Of AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract: 
( J Seller'sjnitlais [ ] ^ / e f s Initi.-1-
The Listing Agent, J^Jff^A^ JDMJ^ f ^P\^\^\ 
i ne Mtttng Agoiu. /CkJ^&f 
,1 nz 3«yi l i**yi 
ififi^e; Represents ^ S e l l e r [ ) Buyer [ ] boih Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent: 
represents [ ] Seller f^ H Suyor [ ] both Buyer and SHter 
as o Limited Agent; 
l*;ifcc 2 t>f t> p a p a Sctlci ' * tnicistts. D j l c Him-r's Imiu 
R*»V a/96 UAR Fgnn i 
The Ucimg Qtokor \^/>^fM^J^ ropravon:, ( / ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Selli 
~ T \-PT^~ 7 rp
 KJ
 a 8 a
 Limited Agen 
The Selling Broker ^ ^ y ^ L y v » / _ v ^ j£jtMJ~&5— lepreents [ ] Seller [VBuyer [ ] both Buyer and Selli 
* / y « o Limited Agen 
O. I f I L C fN^UHAfMCfc . Hi Sen»em(Jni 5G»lur ^yfOws IU U.iy l»l i M.luUdnJ-^.wv-iKytf U W I K S I j | ; v k y »/l lille mau aitue MIJU IH 
Buyer m the amount of mc Purchase Pncc 
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No latni than the Se'ier Disclosure Deadline rcferoneecjn Section 24(b) Seller shall pruvic 
to Buyer the following documents which are uul'cctively iQlorrod to as the 'Seder Disclosures" 
(a) a Seller p»opcrty condition uisciosure tor tnp Property, signed and dated by Seller. 
(b) a commitment lor the policy of title insurance. 
(c) a copy oi any lease* aHcctmg (he Property not oxprmg prio' to Closing 
(0) wnlicn noi*c** of any claims and/or condemns known to Seder relating to environmental problems and building or zonin 
code violations, and 
'*) Other (*psciry) ' c ^ f e & f l & y V ^ ^ f > / f l A 4 / u 
8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyers oblation to purchaso urtdt 
this Contract (check applicable boxes) 
[ 1 IS DO 'S NOT r"nnr1ir|nnpd npnn Rnyor'q apprnval of thr rnntpnt nf all ThP Splipr riisrinsiirps rpfprpnrpd in Spriinn 7 
t>C'S [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer $ aporovai of a physical condition inspection oi the Property, 
( ] IS \yQ IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following losts and evaluation* of the Property, (specify) 
If any of the above items acq checked m the affirmative then Sections 8 18 2 8 3 and 8 4 apply, otherwise they do not apph 
The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred lo as the "Evaluations & Inspections." Unless othenms 
provided m this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid tor by Buyei and shall be conducted by mdrvtouais c 
entities of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees TO cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the walk-through mspectioi 
under Section 11 
8.1 Pertod tor Completion and Review of Evaluations and Inspections. No later than the Buyer Canceilalioi 
Oeadlme referenced in Sebtion 24(c) Buyer snail (a) complete ad Evaluations & Inspections; and (b) determine if the 
Evaluations & Inspections ire acceptable to Buyer 
» 
B.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Ruynr dptprmme.s th.it ihp F valuations & Inspections are unacceotabie, Buyer may 
no tater than the Buyer Cancellation Deadline, cither (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller, whereupor 
the Earnest Money Depos^ *ha!l be released to Buyei cr (b) provide Seller with wntton notice of objections. 
8 3 Failure to Respond. I? by the rxpiraiion of the Buyor Cancellation Deadline Buyer dooc not: (a) cancel thic 
Contract <is provided m Scjction ft 2 or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspection*, me 
Evaluations & inspections ^hatt be doomed approved by Buyer. 
i 
8.4 Reepon» by Seller. It Buyer provides written objections to Setter. Buyor and Seller shall have s*ven calendai days 
alter Sellers r^cetpi of Buyers objections (the R^esponse Penod") in which to agree m wnting upon the manner of resolving 
Buyer's oojections Seller fnay. but shall not pp requ.red lo, resolve Buyers objections If Buyer and Seller havo not agreed 
m wnting upon ihv mannor 0* reviving Buyers objections Buyei may cancel this Contract by providing wrfrtRn nntmp tn SPMPI 
no later than throe calendar days after expuanon of the Response Pfenod, whereupon tnp Earnest Munoy Deposit shall be 
releaser! to Buyer, regardless of whether such cancelation is before or after tltr; Farnost Money Forieitu«e Deadline H this 
Contract is not canceled by Buyer unrinr in-. Scr.non 3 4, Buyers obj^ ciions shall be aeemftd wyivc;n? by Buyer. This waiver 
shall not atfw,! tho c^ ileitis'wan anted «n Section 10 
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There [ ) ARE iV] ARE NOT addend? to this Comma containing additional term:; It thi;./-arc 
the lerriii.. of the following addenda arc? inccpcrnpci mio thiv, Contract jy thtu reference [ ] Addendum No. . 
i ] Survey Addendum { 1 Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum ( ] Assumption Addendum 
{ ] Lead-Based Paint Addendum (in <;ome transactions this addendum is required by law) 
f ] Other (specify) i_ 
f I jL/1 \*MK f M7%" Huw«\ ImhuK £ . £ l>.iti / / 7 / ? 7 r.i^f v o! (» |Mj*r> S^  IU*i '> 1MIII.II 
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10. SELLER WARRANTIES a REPRESENTATIONS. 
10.1 Condition of Title. Seller represent ma: Seller has fee i n< lo the Property and will convey good and marketaole 
title to Buyer at Closing, by general warranty coed unless the sale is being 'nado pursuant to a real estate contract which 
provides tor title to pass af a later date in that case, tide will be conveyed in accordance with the provisions of that contract 
Buyer agrees, however, Ao accept title to the Property subject to the following matters of record easements, oaed restnettons. . 
CC&R*$ (meaning covenants, conditions and restrictions), and rights-of-way and sublet to ihe contents o' the Commitment 
for Tide insurance JS ayreed to by Buyer under Section 8 Buyet also agrees to lake the Property subject lo existing leases 
affecting the Property and not expiring pno; to Casing Quycr a^rooi iu be f^pons'Dle for taxes, assessments, nomeownors 
association dues, utilities and othe' services provided to tho Property rtftor Closing Except for any Joan(s) specifically assumeo 
oy Buyei tinner $ '^%tKjn 2 i(c;. Seller will caueo to fcc paid off by Closing
 ctH rribrtgages. iiubt deeds, judgments, mechanics 
liens, lax uent, and warrants. Seiler>vill owis* to nn paro cuirent by Closing all arsoccrnents and homeowners association du«*. 
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants That the Propety will be m rhc following conoition ON THE DATE SELLER 
DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
(a) tho Property snail be broom-clean and froo of rjehns and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant rnoving*rolated 
damage to the Property shall be repaired at Seller s exppnsp 
(b) tho heating cooling, electncal. plumbing arxj sonnklor systems and fixtures and the appliances anc fireplacus will be 
in working order and fit for thoir intended purposes. 
(c) the roof and foundation shall bo free of leaks kngwn to Seller. 
(d) any prrvate wolf or septic tank serving the Propeny shall have applicable perrrnts, ano shall be in Y/orkmg order and 
tit for its intended purpose; and 
{©) the Property and improvements, including the lancscapmg. wili bo in the same general condition as they were on tfie 
date of Acceptance. 
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Dofore Scttlunwul. Buyer rnuy, upon reasonable notrcs and at a reasonable time. 
Conduct a "waik-lhrouqh" inspection of thy Properly to determine only that the Property if: "at represented." meaning that tne 
items referenced m Sections 1.1, 8.4 and 10.2 ("the items"}"are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed, and in the 
warranted condition tf the items are not as represented. Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or reparr the items or. 
with the consent of Buyer (and Lender it applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same. The failure to 
conduct a walk-through inspection or to cla«m that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a waivar py Buyer ul lire 
nght to receive, on the date pf possession, the items as represented. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the dale of Closing, none of 
the following shaft occur without the prior wntlon consent of Buyer: (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made, (b) 
no new leases sliall be entered into, (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property stvatl be made or undertaken, 
and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made. 
i 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. It Buye' or Sel'er is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability lompany, or other 
«nnty, :h* person executing this Contract on itc behalf werrants n,$ cr her .authouly lu do so and to bind Buy-jr and Seller 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibit*, and Seller Disclosures, 
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces a n y and ail prior negotiations representations, 
warranties, understandings or contracts bOlw<*t?n ihc parties This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement 
of the parties , 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute. Cuwtg pnor to or after Closing, related to this Contract 
[ ] SHALL [J(] MAY (upon rputual agreement of the parties) first be Submitted to mediation tf the parties agree to mediation, 
the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the paities Each pany 
agraos to bear rts own costs of mediation U mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this, Conduct 
shall apply. Nothing m this Section 1D shall prohibit any party trom seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation 
JBMr.i--J ft'A |>;iKi-> Seller \ \\ni\*\//1
 y(y / l ) | l U ' '/^ V ^ ^ HIIVIT1* IhiUaK £/ . £ . Dull- / / / V / f 
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17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
17.1 In Action* to Ehforce this Contract, in ih* ev*m of iitrgyiio* or binding arbitration to cnluice mis Contraci ihe 
prevailing party snail be pntrtled to costs and reasonahtft atlurnpy (pes Attorney IQPS *.halt not he awarded for participation m 
mediation unaer Section ?£. 
17.2 1n Interpleader Actions. If ?, pnnap.'tl Orokor holding the E.irnest Money Deposit is required oy taw tc Wo an 
interpleader action m court to resolve a dispute wet that Deposii. Buyui and Soiler authorize that principal Dro-ker to araw from 
that Deposit an amount neenssary to advance the court costs noedea to bring that interpleader action The amount of the 
Deposit remaining alter advancing those costs srv*li he interpleaded into court Buyer at\6 S«liei 'urther agree that whichever 
ot them is tound to be m default may bo ordered to pay -my reasonable attorney fees, or additional couri cdst>. incurred by the 
principal broker :n t inging trie* action. unless the court frndo that there wa.- fault uu the pan of tht- principal broker of his or her 
agent that would make such'an award of attorney fees and cost:; unjust 
18. NOTICES. Except as provided ;n Section z:\. an nonces requiied unoer this Contract must be (a) <n anting; (b) signrd 
by the party giving notice: and (C) received by the othei party or the other party's agent no later thar> the applicable date 
referenced in this Contract 
19. ABROGATION. Except tor the provisions of Sections 15 and \7 1 and express warranties nude in mis Contract. the 
provisions of this Contract shall not apply after C'osmq 
20. RISK OF LOSS. Alt risk of Joss lo the Property not caused b/ Seller or Buyer, including physical damage or destwction 
to the Property or its improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by \\ taking m eminent 
domain, shall be borne by Seller until Seller delivers possession of tho Property to Buyer. 
21. TIME (S OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth m this Contiact Extensions must bo 
agreed to in writing ny all parties. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Contract, (a) performance under each Section of 
this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 0:00 PM Mountacn Timo on tnc slated date: and (b) the 
term "days" shall moan calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers the timing 
requirement (i.c . Accoptance, receipt of the Seller Disclosures, etc.;. Performance dates and times referenced harem snail 
not be binding uoon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed 
to m writing by such non-party. 
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any 
addenda and counteroffers, fthd the retransmission ot any signed fax shatt be tne same as delivery of an original. This pGOVfilCt 
and any *rirlFndj and countorofforu may be eu&uteJ •M v*uu(it«(pv<ns. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer ot the other: (a) signs 
the otter or counteroffer whef© noted to indicate acceptance: and (h) communicates to the other party or to the other party's 
agent that the Offer or counteroffer has been signed as requirea 
24. CONTRACT DEADLINE Buyer and Sftitur agiee that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract: 
(a) Applicat ion Deadline No later than Is calendar day* after Acceptance. 
(b) Seller Disclosure Deadline No lat*r than yO calendar days after Acceptance. 
(e) Buyer Cancellation Deadline No later than j u <C calendar days after Buyer's receipt of ell of the 
i Seller Disclosures, 
(d) Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline _JT . . calendar days, aper thp Buyer Cancellation Deadline. 
(9) Settlement Deadline J . ytfazsy^t 1 / /fffiOATE) 
25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Ruyer otters to purchase the Property on th^ahovg»temreand conditions II 
Soiler doos not accept this ofjer by ^ P-y>4 ] AM [)(] PM Mountain Time ^ f * r ' ° ^ / * ' "'JJH^T*>- ! 9 ^ • 
this offer shall 'apse and I hi? jBrokerag© snail return the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer 
(Buyers Signature) ' (Offer Date) (Buyers S«g 
T»K> I Ate* of tho »bovc Ofle< Ociicw wh«li bo r^ien-ed lo «s trw 'Otter R«i#rence Dtttc" 
{Suyurs1 Names) (PLEASE PRINT) / / {Ntv..r* Across) (Pliunr) 
l*»fte *iif(, |Mj»r* Seller** lnili.»U / f / i ,- , , v / / ^ / / / N U Y I T \ liiitinls £3, £ , Dulv / / 7/^/7 
j >£ //7/?7 
^ev6/9t) 
r- -
 H , , T 214 3S6 4579 P.01 
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ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE: 
fl^ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE* fi l ler Accepts the forttyoi'ig otti^ r on the tyrmc r.nd condition* :>peclfled 
ahove. 
] CQONTEROFFEffl/Sdlter presents lor Buyers Acceptance me terms of Buyer's offer subject to iho exceptions or 
the attached ADDENDUM NQ 
_jl/3jf± JttJ* ±*± 
("SeHcfrs t^gnature) ~j (Date) (lime") (Soiled Signature) (Dale) (Time) 
tbfan Q.fflkL 
jWers* Names) (PLEASE PWNT) (SeWers* Names) (PLEASE PWNT) (Notice Address) (Phone) 
[ 1 REJECTION: Seller Recocts the foregoing offer 
(Seller's Signature) (Data) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
Stale law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seder with copies oi this Contract Deanng an signatures (Ffl m applicable 
section below.) 
A. 1 acknowledge receipt or la final copy of the forogomg Contract bearing all signatures: 
Buyer's Signature) (Dale) (Buyer's Signature) (Date) 
Gelled Signature) (Dutc) (Seller's Signature) (Date) 
\ I personally caused a final copy of me foregoing Contmci bearing all Signatures to be [ } faxed [ ] malted I ] hand 
ieiivered on „ _J . 19 . postage prepaid, to the [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer. 
Sent/DeHvered by {specify) „ 
THIS FORM APPROVED 3Y THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE Of THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENEfUL. 
£FF€<mVE JUN£ 1 7 , 1 ^ 6 . fT REPLACES ANO SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VEft&OMS OP THIS FORM 
I'utti* & ul '6 |iitgvs Seller's Initials l>;ilr i W n n "s hmi . iU Dull 
^0/9r: 
APPENDIX "D" 
Judgment, Canyon Country Realty v. Mo|il| 
entered March 17, 1998" (R. 102B-103BT 
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER 
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
394 West 400 North 
Moab,Utah 84532 
Telephone: (801)259-7321 SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FILED MAR 17 1398 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
CANYON COUNTRY REALTY, 
and COLDWELL 
BANKER/ARCHES REALTY, 
Plaintiffs, 
NELSON MOYLE, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9707-96 
Judge Anderson 
The Court having made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the case, 
now hereby awards 
JUDGMENT, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Nelson Moyle as 
follows: 
1. A commission of $11,100 ($185,000 contract price @ 6%); 
2. Interest at the legal rate of 10% for contracts not specifying a rate of interest from 
January 13,1997 to March 3,1998, in the amount of $1,295. See, Sec. 15-1-1, U.C.A. 
3. Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the action. In this 
regard, counsel for the plaintiffs is directed to submit an Affidavit of costs and attorneys fees, and 
provide the same to counsel for the defendant for review prior to determination by the Court 
4. Interest on the total Judgment as calculated above at the rate of 9:408% (7.468 + 
irU.GA.) from March 3,1998, until paid. 
Dated this//_ clay of / ^i^Z^ 1998. 
BY THE COURT 
J-
THJ/HONORABLE ix&k 
District Court Judge 
^L 
RSON 
Approved as to Form & Content 
Leslie Slaugh 
Attorney for the Defendant 
APPENDIX "E" 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Copeland v. Moyle. entered March 17, 1998 
(R. 191A-203A) 
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER 
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
394 West 400 North SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Moab,Utah 84532 Grand County, Utah 
Telephone: (801)259-7321 
FILED MAR 1 7 1998 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
GEORGE & SHARON 
COPELAND, 
Findings of Fact & 
Plaintiffs, Conclusions of Law 
v. 
Civil No. 9707-77 
NELSON MOYLE, 
Judge Anderson 
Defendant. 
On March 3, 1997, the Court heard cross-motions for summary judgment The parties 
were both present represented by counsel of record. After considering the record, pleadings and 
argument of the respective parties, the Court hereby makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant listed certain real property for sale located at 590 North 500 West 
in Moab, Grand County, Utah. 
2. On January 7, 1997, George and Sharon Copeland submitted a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract for the property through their agent Kelly Stelter of Coldwell Banker/Arches Realty. 
3. The offer was submitted to defendant on January 13, 1997, and accepted in 
writing. A copy of the Real Estate Purchase Contract is attached hereto and incorporated by reference. 
4. In accepting the offer, the defendant added the following language to Section 1.2 
(Excluded Items) on the Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
"All skis, water & snow, bikes, kayaks and other personal sports 
equipment not included." 
5. The Court finds that language to be superfluous and of no impact to the accepted 
offer since the Buyers had not offered to purchase the excepted items. (This Finding applies even 
if, as defendant alleged, some or all of the excepted equipment had been used for rental by 
customers of defendants bed & breakfast) 
6. The defendant also inserted his name in Section 5 (Confirmation of Agency 
Disclosure) of the Real Estate Purchase Contract 
7. The Court finds this addition was merely disclosure as required by law of the 
fact that defendant was, at all relevant times, a licensed real estate agent, and that such disclosure 
did not effect the substantive rights or obligations of the Buyers or Seller in the transaction. 
8. Following his acceptance of the Copelands' offer, defendant submitted an 
"Addendum No. 1" which purported to increase the price of the property from $185,000 to 
$255,000. 
9. Defendant thereafter failed and refused to close the real estate transaction. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court hereby makes and enters the 
following, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's acceptance of the Copelands7 purchase offer as set forth above 
constitutes a valid and binding contract for the purchase of the real estate. 
2. Defendant's exclusion of personal property which the buyers had not offered to 
purchase did not constitute a Counteroffer, as a matter of law. 
3. Defendant's agency disclosure did not impact the contact that had been created 
by his acceptance of the Copelands7 purchase offer, as a matter of law. 
4. Defendant breached the real estate contract by failing to close the transaction and 
transfer the property. 
5. Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
GRANTED, and defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED. A further 
hearing will be required to determine the nature and extent of damages suffered by the plaintiffs 
resulting from defendant's breach of the real estate contract 
6. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the 
action pursuant to Section 17 of the Real Estate Purchase Contract 
Dated thisffrday of ffflo^rM 1998. 
BY THE COURT 
y j LIST, -o AGREEMENT & AGENCY ^CLOSURE 
REALTOR' (PART A) 
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT 
READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING 
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into by and between < ^ Q ^ ^ ^ C^c^u^^Zy fc*^£Z^y 
(the "Company") and M«&im^ /i^^y£^ (the "Seller") 
1. TERM OF LISTING. The Seller hereby grants the Company, including / ^ ^ o t x ^ r fCsO-^^ (the 
"Seller's Agent") as the authorized agent for the Company, for the penod of / fa months starting on the 
date of execution of this Listing Agreement, and ending at 5:00 P.M on the / ^ day of IF'JLA-Z 199 7 . 
(the "Listing Period"), the Exclusive Rigfit to Sell, Lease, or Exchange certain real property owned by the Seller, 
described as JTlC A,( Cfit If, _
 ( t he 
"Property"), at the price and terms stated on the attached board/association property data information form, or at such 
other price and terms to which the Seller may agree in writing. The Seller's Agent agrees to use reasonable efforts to 
find a buyer or tenant for the Property 
2. BROKERAGE FEE. If, during the Listing Period, the Company, the Seller's Agent, the Seller, another real estate 
agent, or anyone else locates a party who is ready, willing and able to buy, lease, or exchange (collectively referred to 
as "acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at the listing pnce and terms stated on the attached board/association 
property data information form, or any other price and terms to which the Seller may agree in writing, the Seller agrees 
to pay to the Company a broker fee in the amount of $ -*£) or £> % of such acquisition price. The 
brokerage fee, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the Seller and the Company, shall be due and payable on the 
date of closing of the acquisition of the Property. If a ready, willing, and able buyer is located as provided in this 
section above, and the Seller refuses to contract or to close, the Seller shall be obligated to immediately pay to the 
Company the brokerage fee listed above. The Company is authorized to share the brokerage fee with another 
brokerage participating in any transaction arising out of this Listing Agreement. 
3. EXTENSION PERIOD. If within < ^ — months after the termination or expiration of this Listing Agreement, the 
Property is acquired by any party to whom the Property was offered or shown by the Company, the Seller's Agent, the 
Seller, or another real estate agent dunng the Listing Penod, the Seller agrees to pay to the Company the brokerage 
fee stated in Section 2 unless the Seller is obligated to pay a brokerage fee on such acquisition to another brokerage 
pursuant to another valid sales agency contract entered into after the expiration or termination date of this Listing 
Agreement. 
4. SELLER WARRANTIES/DISCLOSURES. The Seller warrants to the Company that the mdividual(s)/entity listed 
above as the "Seller" represent all of the record owners of the Property. The Seller warrants that it has marketable title 
and an established right to sell, lease, or exchange the Property. The Seller agrees to execute the necessary 
documents of conveyance and to prorate general taxes, insurance, rents, interest and other expenses affecting the 
Property to the agreed date of possession The Seller agrees to furnish the buyer at closing good and marketable title 
with a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price In the event the acquisition includes personal 
property, the Seller agrees to sign a Bill of Sale with warranties as to title to the personal property The Seller agrees 
to fully inform the Seller's Agent regarding the Seller's knowledge of the condition of the Property Upon signing of this 
Listing Agreement, the Seller agrees to personally complete and sign a Seller's property condition disclosure 
statement The Seller agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Seller's Agent and the Company against any claims 
which may arise from: (i) the Seller's providing incorrect or inaccurate information regarding the Property, or (n) the 
Seller's failure to disclose material information regarding the Property, including, but not limited to the condition of all 
appliances, heating, plumbing, and electrical fixtures and equipment, sewer, and moisture or other problems in the roof 
or foundaton, and the location of property lines 
5. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS. The following is a brief but very important explanation regarding the nature of agency 
relationships between the Seller, the buyer the Company and the real estate agents involved in a sale of the propertv 
/ 
broker is referred to as a Priru .1. ^roker or a Branch Broker (if the broke, ^ nas a branch office) The broker is 
responsible for operation of the brokerage and for the professional conduct of all agents 
5.2 Right of Agents to Represent Seller and/or Buyer. An agent may represent, through the 
brokerage, a seller who wants to sell property or a buyer who wants to buy property On occasion, an agent will 
represent both seller and buyer in the same transaction When an agent represents a seller, the agent is a "Seller's 
Agent"; when representing a buyer, the agent is a "Buyer's Agent", and when representing both seller and buyer, the 
agent is a "Limited Agent". 
5.3 Requirement of Written Agreement. To represent a seller, a buyer, or both, a written agreement is 
required. Except as provided below, the Principal/Branch Broker also represents whomever the agent represents; and 
regardless of whom the agent represents, the agent owes a duty of honesty and fair dealing to all parties to the 
transaction. 
5.4 Seller's Agent. A Seller's Agent works to assist the seller in locating a buyer and in negotiating a 
transaction suitable to the seller's specific needs. A Seller's Agent has fiduciary duties to the seller which include 
loyalty, full disclosure, confidentiality, diligence, obedience, reasonable care, and holding safe monies entrusted to the 
agent 
5.5 Buyer's Agent. A Buyer's Agent works to assist the buyer in locating and negotiating the acquisition of 
a property suitable to that buyer's specific needs A Buyer's Agent has the same fiduciary duties to the buyer that the 
Seller's Agent has to the Seller. 
5.6 Limited Agent. A Limited Agent represents both seller and buyer in the same transaction and works to 
assist in negotiating a mutually acceptable transaction. A Limited Agent has fiduciary duties to both seller and buyer. 
However, those duties are "limited" because the agent cannot provide to both parties undivided loyalty and full 
disclosure of all information known to the agent. For this reason, a Limited Agent must remain neutral in the 
representation of a seller and buyer, and may not disclose to either party information likely to weaken the bargaining 
position of the other; such as, the highest pnee the buyer will pay or the lowest price the seller will accept. A Limited 
Agent must, however, disclose to both parties material information known to the Limited Agent regarding a defect in 
the Property and/or the ability of each party to fulfill agreed upon obligations. 
5.7 In-House Sale. If the buyer for the Seller's Property is also represented by an agent in the Company, that 
transaction is commonly referred to as an "In-House Sale". Most In-House Sales involve limited agency because 
seller and buyer are represented by one or more agents in the Company. In-House Sales can occur in any of the 
following ways: 
(a) In-House Sale/One Agent. In this situation there is only one agent in the Company involved in 
the transaction - that agent represents both Seller and buyer. Therefore, the Seller's Agent and the 
Principal/Branch Broker are required to: (i) act as Limited Agents; and (ii) inform the Seller 
regarding the limited agency when a buyer, who is also represented by the Seller's Agent, first 
expresses an interest in the Property. 
(b) In-House Sale/Two Agents, in this situation there are two different agents in the Company 
involved in the transaction. One represents the Seller - one represents the buyer, and the 
Principal/Branch Broker acts as a Limited Agent. In such a transaction, the Seller's Agent is required 
to inform the Seller regarding the limited agency of the Principal/Branch Broker when a buyer 
represented by another agent in the Company, first expresses an interest in the Property. 
(c) In-House Sale/All Agents, in this situation all agents in the Company, including the 
Principal/Branch Broker, represent both the Seller and the buyer as Limited Agents. In such a 
transaction, the Seller's Agent is required to inform the Seller regarding the limited agency when a 
buyer also represented by an agent in the Company, first expresses an interest in the Property 
5.8 Conflicts with the In-House Sale. There are conflicts associated with an In-House Sale; for example, 
agents affiliated with the Company discuss with each other the needs of their respective buyers or sellers Such 
discussions could inadvertently compromise the confidentiality of inf6rmation provided to those agents For that 
reason, the Company has policies designed to protect the confidentiality of discussions between agents and access 
to confidential client and transaction files ^i/y7 / ^ 
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relationship with the Compan* 
[ ] (a) [K] 0 n e Ayent in the Company. The Sellers Agent aru the Principal/Branch Broker 
Seller's will represent the Seller. 
Initials 
[ 3 (b) [ ] All Agents in the Company. All agents in the Company, including the Principal/Branch 
Seller's Broker, will represent the Seller. 
Initials 
If 5.9(a) is checked, the Seller authorizes the Seller's Agent or the Principal/Branch Broker to appoint another agent in 
the Company to also represent the Seller, in the event the Seller's Agent or the Principal/Branch Broker will be 
unavailable to service the Property. 
5.10 Authorization for Limited Agency. The Seller is advised that the Seller is not required to accept a 
limited agency situation in the Company. However, it is the business practice of the Company to participate in In-House 
Sales. In the event the In-House Sale involves limited agency, the Seller agrees to the following: (Seller initial 
applicable box) 
[ ] 
Seller's 
initials 
[ ] 
Seller's 
Initials 
[ ] 
Seller's 
Initials 
(a) [ $ '"-House Sale/One Agent. The Seller's Agent and the Principal/Branch 
Broker are authorized to represent both the Seller and a prospective 
buyer as Limited Agents. 
(b) [ ] In-House Sale/Two Agents. The Seller's Agent will exclusively represent 
the Seller, another agent in the Company will exclusively represent 
the buyer, and the Principal/Branch Broker will act as a Limited Agent. 
(c) [ ] In-House Sale/All Agents. (Only applicable if 5.9(b) has been selected) 
All agents in the Company, including the Principal/Branch Broker, 
will represent both the Seller and the buyer as Limited Agents. 
6. PROFESSIONAL ADVICE. The Company and the Seller's Agent are trained in the marketing of real estate. 
Neither the Company, nor the Seller's Agent are trained to provide the Seller or any prospective buyer with legal or tax 
advice, or with technical advice regarding the physical condition of the Property. If the Seller desires advice 
regarding: (i) legal or tax matters; (ii) the physical condition of the Property; or (iii) this Listing Agreement, the Seller's 
Agent and the Company STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE SELLER OBTAIN SUCH INDEPENDENT ADVICE. 
7. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after a closing, related to this 
Listing Agreement [ ] SHALL [X3 MAY first be submitted to mediation. If the parties agree to mediation, the 
dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party 
agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. If mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this 
Listing Agreement shall apply. 
8. ATTORNEY FEES. Except as provided in Section 7, in case of the employment of an attorney in any matter 
arising out of this Listing Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the other party all costs and 
attorney fees, whether the matter is resolved through court action or otherwise. If, through no fault of the Company, 
any litigation arises out of the Seller's employment of the Company under this Listing Agreement (whether before or 
after a closing), the Seller agrees to indemnify the Company and the Seller's Agent from all costs and attorney fees 
incurred by the Company and/or the Seller's Agent in pursuing and/or defending such action. 
9. INFORMATION RELEASE. The Company is authorized to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or 
other party holding a lien or interest on the Property. 
10. MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE. The Company is authorized and instructed to offer this Property through the 
Multiple Listing Sen/ice of the x&s^zsr^ i ^JJ^yr^^Q^c^cur^y board/association of 
REALTORS®- The Company is further authorized to disclose after closing the final terms and sales price of the 
Property. 
11. KEY BOX. The Company [ ] I'S [>0 IS NOT authorized and instructed to have a key box installed on the Property. 
The Company [ ] IS T>0 I S N 0 T authorized to have a key to the Property. The Company [ ^ ] IS [ ] IS NOT 
authorized to hold "Open Houses" at the Property. The Seller acknowledges that the Company has discussed with the 
Seller the safeguarding of personal property and valuables located within the Property'. The Seller further acknowledges 
Page 3 of 4 
UAR Form 8 
^Seller's Initials Date 
responsibility for any loss or d
 w - that might result from the use of the k . Keybox from any source whatsoever 
and agrees to hold the Company and the Seller's Agent harmless from any and all liability as a result of having the key 
to the Property and having the keybox installed on the Property If a tenant occupies the Property on other than a 
"nightly rental basis", the tenant agrees to the installation of a keybox and joins in the waiver and release of the Seller's 
Agent and the Company as provided above. 
(Tenant Signature) (Date) 
12. SIGNAGE. The Company is authorized to place an appropriate sign on the Property. 
13. ATTACHMENT. The provisions of the attached board/association properly data information form are 
incorporated by this reference. In order to complete the property data information form the Seller's Agent may provide 
the Seller with a courtesy estimate of the square footage of the Property. As an estimate the square footage figure 
shall not be relied upon by the Seller or the buyer in their decision to purchase/sell the Property 
14. EARNEST MONEY DEPOSITS. As part of an offer to purchase the Property a potential buyer will typically 
deliver an Earnest Money Deposit to the brokerage which assists the buyer in preparing that offer The Company is 
hereby authorized and directed to accept on behalf of the Seller, and to hold in its trust account, any Earnest Money 
Deposit delivered to the Company by a potential buyer. 
15. PRELIMINARY TITLE REPORT. In order to: (i) identify potential title concerns, and (n) avoid possible delays in 
marketing the Property, the Company recommends that the Seller, upon signing this Listing Agreement, authorize the 
Company to order a Preliminary Title Report ("PR") on the Property from 
(Name of Title Company). The Seller: [ ] AUTHORIZES [ X ] DOES NOT AUTHORIZE the Company to 
immediately order a PR and [ ] ENCLOSES [ ^ ] DOES NOT ENCLOSE a check for the cost of the same. 
16. EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY. The Property will be presented in compliance with Federal, State and local 
anti-discrimination laws. 
17. FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENT. Facsimile transmission of a signed copy of this Listing Agreement, and 
retransmission of any signed facsimile transmission, shall be the same as delivery of an original. If this transaction 
involves multiple owners this Listing Agreement may be executed in counterparts. 
18. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This Listing Agreement, including the Seller's property condition disclosure form, and the 
attached board/association property data information form, contains the entire agreement between the parties relating 
to the subject/matter of this Listing Agreement. This Listing Agreement may not be modified or amended except in 
writing signeja by the parties her^ra. 
ereby agree to the terms of this Listing Agreement. 
(Address/Phone) 
(Seller's Signature) (Address/Phone) (Date) 
(Seller's Signature) (Address/Phone) (Date) 
THIS LISTING AGREEMENT shall become effective only upon acceptance by the Company as evidenced by its 
signature below. 
ACCEPTED by the Company 
by by: 
(Authorized Seller's Agent) (Date) (Principal/Branch Broker) (Date) 
WHITE Broker CANARY Seller s Agent PINK Seller 
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ES REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT t£j 
TWi I* t toytfty WritUnfl cofSTiCt. Utah Irw r^qu l ro r*s1 «*3rt* llc*n*««»» to U M t h b farm. Buy*r #r>d £*i l*<, ho»rt*«r, may iynw lo cftar of ctofeti 
I t i provision* Of to w»« • dTtfwrfrtt form. tf you o* i i r * t*gif or tax r W w , con«im your i t tomty of tax ftc5vt»or. 
jescrtbed below a/id hereby d i^v< 
thail be deported :n acrarriapee \ 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
_ZAyrJ(__ ^ . otters topuWaSe'the Property 
d i I a & Q v^er.3 to ihe 5rote'age/&3 tamest Money, the amount of s ^ n j M t ^ ^ ^ V ? " ^ ^ ^^ *orm ol 
s l a 
Received by. 
st 
. which, upon Acceptance of this otter Dy ail parties (as defined in Section 23). 
. on _ _ .{Date) 
Brokerage: / ^ # < J £ * r f K/AXJ&A/AkA^fisi jfe*J%*iPbcne Number - ; <<2 • <X<?Z 
; , OFFER TO PURCHASE y 
PROPERTY; ^ / f f &^JS<^^ S*+IO AS Z&J* tjj &*„ l— 
described as- *'/^* ^ ^ v ^ L x * ^ - ^ r — y T ^ u J >£-£-#* c /S-^^^L^Tw^r^>-^7^ also i   (C ^^A^^  ^ J ^ ^ J ^ j ^ / £ > L ^ 
C»Y of ?%Z2«^&^ County of ^ £ - State of Utah (the •PnDporcy'). 
1.1 Indudad ftems.1 Unless excluded herein, this sale incudes the followTng items it presently attached to Ihe Property 
piumDing. heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater, built-in appliances; light Sxtures and bulbs 
bathroom fixtures: curtains,^draperies zt\4 rsdz; window and door 6cr*£ns, slum! duui* and windy***, window Winds; awnings 
installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets; automatic garage door opener and 
accompanying transmftter(s); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The fallowing items shaJJ aisc bo included in ttts sale and 
conveyed wider separate gill %\ Sale wHh vragantles as ia title; ^ f f ^^^^^JZ^l^^tr'' Ff^^^f^xt 
jwing items are exclud lufled Itema. The follo j ed from I 
•tar Right*. The following water rights ajajnduded in this'sale; ^B0**&- • — • • " ^ ^ j ^ f i ^ 1,3 Wi o
1.4 Sutve^. A survcj/map 9 W& Property certified 6y a licensed surveyor [ ] WILL \jQ WILL NOT be prepared. The 
Property comers [pQ WILL! [ J WILL NOT be marked by survey stakes set by a licensed surveyor or engineering company. 
The cost 0? me applicable items checked above will be: [ ] paid by Buy* [ ] p«id by Svllvr [tf) mhervd equally by Buyer 
andSaIl*r[ ] Other Specify) 
j . For aadttlonai terms, see enached Survey Addendum if applicable. 
2. PURCHASE PRICE, The Purchase Pnce for the Property is S, 
d of Payment. The Purchase Pnce win oe paid as follows: 
*f£r (a) Eornest Monty Deposit Under certain conditions described In thl* Contract, THIS 
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE. sc (b) N«w Loan. Buyor agrees to apply for a rtew loan as provideo: in Section 2.3. £uy«r will apply lor 
one or tnoro of the foilowino loans: ( } CONVENTIONAL { ] FHA [ } VA 
; [ ] OTHER (specify) 
': If an FHA/VA loan applies, see attached FHA/VA Loan Addendum. 
! If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and oive detailr-: 
1
 [ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS 
5 _ _ 
B. /tfdfi**. 
z 
(c) Lo«n Assumption (sec a^achQd Assumption Addendum if applicable) 
ac^pd 
c i In Cash *t Settlemeot / i ^ 
ip\ 5^llor Financing (see au Sailer Financing Addendum if ap^piijaWe) 
^ {t) B«lcno« of Purchaw Pri 
PURCHASE PRICE. Total n< lines (a) through (t) 
' ^i^€^fl/^U^ 
Pii^r 1 ufO pnp.vs Seller's Initial: 
a«viv9« 
\>«*!IB/M-
5C~ 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIRIT 1 UAP Form f 
2.2 Financing Condition, (ohook applicable boi) 
(a) $<3 Buyers obligation to purchase tKe Droper^/ IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the appticaoic loan(s; 
referenced in Section 2 Kb) o- (r) 'thn "Loan") This rendition is referred to as fie "ciruncang Condition " 
(b) [ ] Buyer's obligation to pu«c/ioso (ho Property fS NOT conditioned upon Suyer qualifying for £ Joan Section 2 3 
doos^not apply 
i 
2.3 Application fOf Loan. 
(a) Buyer's duties. No later than the Appitcatior Deodlme referenced m Soctron ?4{a) Buyer shall apply for the Loan 
"Loan Application" occurs only when BLver has (0 completed bigned and deirvered to the tender (the "Lender") 
the trwiial loan application and documentation lequrred by the Lendor *rd (u) pajd all loan application lees as 
/squired by the Lender Bdycr agrees to diligently wcrk to ootem the Loan. Buyer will promptly provide the Lender 
witn any additional docum*nUliun as reouired by no Lender 
(b) Procedure It Loan Application 1$ denied, it buyet receives written rtuitu* from the Lender that the Lonoer does 
not approve tne Loan (a "Loan Denial"). Buyer shall, no later than three calendar days thereafter provide a copy to 
Seller Buyer or Seller may within three calendar days aftor Seller s receipt of such notice, cancel this Contract by 
providing wrmen notice to the other party in the event of a cancellation under this Section 2.0(b) 0) »* the Loan 
Denial was <ecervecl by Buyer on or before the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline referenced ir Section 24(d), the 
Earnest Money1 Deposit shall be returned to Buyer, (n) rf the Loan Denial was received Dy Buyer after the Earnest 
Money FortemJre Deadline, Buyer agrees to iorleit, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy, the 
Earnest Money as liquidated damages A failure to rancel as provided in this Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on 
the Financing Condition set forth m Section 2 2(a) Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any otter section of 
this Contract shad be governed oy such other provisions. 
2.4 Appraisal of Property. Buyer * oWgation to purchase the Property [ J IS £Xj IS NOT conditioned upon the 
Property appraising for not less than thw Purchase Pace if ma appraisal condition applies and the Property appraises for less 
than the Purtnaso Pnce. Buyer may cancel this Contract Dy providing written notice to Seller no later than t vee calendar days 
after Buyer's receipt of notice of the appraised value In the event crt such cancellation, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be 
released to Buyer, regardless of whether such cancellation ts before or aftor the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline A failure 
to cancel as provided trt this Section 2 4 shall be deemed a waiver ol the appraisal condition by Buyer. 
i 
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. Settlement shall take place on or before the Settlement Deadline referenced m Section 
24(0) •Settlement" shall!occur only when all of tne following have been completed: (a) Buyer and Sefter have signed and 
deivered to oacn other or io the escrow/dosing office alt documents required by this Contraci. by the Lender, by written escrow 
irrtniftinm nr by apphcaae law. fb) «ny monies required to be paid by Buyer under tnose documents (except for me proceeds 
ol any new lean) hava been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrnvwrarvung ottice in tne torm o* coueaao or cieated fuiid*, 
and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under those documents have been delivered by Sette' to Buyer or to the 
escrow/closing office In thfe form of collected or cleared funds Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-naif (1/2) of the tee charged 
by the escrow/closing office for its services m the settiement/dosmg process. Taxes and assessments tor the current year 
rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall bo prorated al Settlement as set forth in this Section. Tenant deposits 
(including, but not hrmted fo, security deposits, cleaning deposits and prt**»*d I« I IU ) »haJi be paid or credited by Seller to Buyoi 
at Settlement Prorations set forth m this Section snotf be made as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced m Section 24(e) 
unless otherwise agreed tp in writing by the parties Such wnting could mciuoe the settlement statement. The transaction wit 
be considered closed w»)en Settlement has been completed, and when all of the following have been completed (i) the 
proceeds of any new loam have been uobvervd by the Lender to Seller w lu ih* owow/clocing office; and (»/ the applicable 
Closing documents have .been recorded m the offcee of the county recorder. The actions dc^enbed m parts (i) and (u) ot the 
preceding sentence shall'be completed wrthm four calendar days of Settlement 
. POSSESSION, 5>rtlpr shall deliver physical possesion to Buyer within- [)6 ^L hours [ ] clays after Closing 
] Other (specify) _ _ L _ . _ . : . 
4 
I 
S 
( 
The Listing Agent 
l nc betting Agenl. y f ^ r > ^ V 
CONFIRMATION Of AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the bigninq of this Contract 
J Seller's Initials [ ] Saver's Initia » J 9^/er' i ls 
) Buyer [ ] boih Buy*r and Sells 
es a Limited Agenl 
roproocntr, [ ] Seller (VI Buy or [ J both Buyer and SHIP 
HU o Limited Agenl 
I'.ifcv 2 of *> p*ue* Sctk'i \ lni(j.iU_ D J U 
n**va/96 ^AR Fonn 
The Lictuiy Cjioko*. J\^*t 
The Selling Broker. $~C4^fi 
copravon:-, [^Seller [ ] Buyer ( ] hoih Ruyer and Selh 
~ . as a Limited Agen 
^k^tMJ^O—- represents [ 1 Seller fVouyer ( ] both Buyer and Sefli 
/ ~
 uo a limited Agen 
Buyer in me aniount of the Purchase Pncc. 
\/\ litlc ii i3vi:ai iv>e ntjuiii 
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No utsr than the Seller Disclosure Deadline rcforonceclin Section 24(b). Seller shall pruvic 
to Buyer tno following documents which cue collectively iGlurrou io as the 'Seller Discipsures" 
(a) a Seller property condition lii^cto^nre -or tn« Property, signed and.dated by Seller; 
a commitment for rhe policy of title insurance; 
a copy of y.ny loasos affecting (he Property not expiring prior to Dosing, 
wnltcn noi'C^ of any dRims and/nr conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or zonir 
code violation^ and ; ,
 x Or— ^  i=H___^Lw~-^^/ /-> j * , , 
(c) 
«H 
(e) Oth&r (£p*cify) _ , , , , , , ^ ^ ^ .. _ _ ,_ 
8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's objpation to purchaso utxJi 
this Contraci (check applicable boxes). 
[ 1 ^  DO ^ NOT rnnriirlnnpd upon Ruyor'q appmva\ nf thr rnntpni nf nil Vnp Spllpr nisrinsurpq rpfpfpnrpd in fcprtmn 7" 
foC'S [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of me Property; 
( ] IS ^ } IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following iosts and evaluations of the Property: (specify) 
It any of the above itoms ar$ checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8 1 8.2. 8 3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise they do not appl' 
The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to as the "Evaluations & Inspections." Unless othenms 
provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by individuals < 
entities of Buyer's choice. Setter agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & inspoctions and wcth the walk-through inspectio 
under Section .11. 
8.1 Period tor Completion and Review of Evaluations and Inspections. No later than the Buyer CanceHatio 
Oeadline referenced in Section 24(c) Buyor snail, (a) complete atf Evaluations & Inspections; and (b) determine if th 
Evaluations & Inspections are acceptaoie to Buyer. 
B.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Ruynr n>tf?rmtnf*js th.it ih* Fvaluations & Inspections are unacceotabie, Buyer ma\ 
no later than the Buyer Cancellation Deadline, cither, (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Setter, whereupo 
the Earnest Money OcposH shall be released to Buyer, or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections. 
8 3 Failure to Respond. K by the expiration ol the Buyor Cancellation Deadline. Buyer dooc not: (a) cancel thi 
Contract as provided in Section # 2. or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & inspoctions. th 
Evaluations & inspections ihatt be doomed approved by Buyer. 
8.4 Reeponsa by Seller. If Buyer provides wnnen objections to Seller. Buyor and Seller shall have s-sven calendar day 
alter Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (iho "Response Penod') in which to agree in wnting upon the manner of resotVim 
Buyer's oojections. Seller may. but shall nor be requ.red to, resolve Buyer's objections if Buyer and Seller havo not agrees 
m wnting upon triv manner &>f resolving PuyCTs objections. Buyer may cancel this Contraci by providing wrrrmn nottr.n in s^iif! 
no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response Period, whereupon tne Earnest Murray Deposit shall b< 
released to Buyer, regardless of whether such cancellation is before or after the* Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline. It ihr 
Contract is not canceled by Buyer wndnr ih**. Section 6 4, Buyers objections shall be aeemt>d waived by Buyer. This waive 
shall not tiHf;tf those items', wan anted «n Section 10 
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. Thcro [ ] ARE §(] ARE NOT addenda !othir. Co.mac! containing additional lorn.-; if iht;:/* ,irr; 
Uic term* of the following addenda are ineo«pcr)fierj mio this Contract jy this reference [ ] Addendum No. 
t 1 Survey Addendum {= 1 Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addcndun 
{ ] Lead-Based Paint Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is required by taw) 
f J Other (specify) ._. 
V 
\ / 
Hnv f)f'.H, I S jA f< ' »-.si« ' 
10 SELLER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTATIONS 
10.1 Corrdltion of Title, Seller represent ma: 5^'cr ^as (ee \ n< to the Property ana will convey good and marketaofe 
title to Buyer at Closing by general warranty coed unless the sale »t> being made pursuant to a real estate contract which 
provides lor title to pass af a later dare in (Nat v.ase title will be conveyed in accordance with the provisions of that contract 
Buyer agrees, however, Ac accept title to the Property sub)ecf to the following matters of record easements oeed restnettons. 
CC&R'$ (meaning covenanrs condrrions and rostncitons) ard right-, of w<iy and subject to the contents o- the Commitment 
for Title Invursnce JS ayreea to by Buyer unfac Soction 8 Buyei also agrees to take the Property subject 10 existing leases 
affecting I ho Property and not expiring prior to Casing Ouycr a^roos iv be 'e;>coni><olc for taxes, assessments, homeowners 
association dues, utilities and otne' services provided TO the Property i:u;r Closing Except for any loan(s) specifically assumeo 
oy Buyfti tinriPt .?f»,%t»on 2 He/. Seller win cau^o to be paid off by Closing
 ciH mortgages, tiubi Uetrdb judgments, mechanics 
hens, tax i;ena» and warranto, SellerjwiJi cnusp to no pate curent by Closing all weoexments arxj rtomeowners association du«>. 
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants mat t*c Property will be m the following condition ON THE DATE SELLER 
DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER. 
(a) mo Property shall be broom-clean and trco of denns and personal belongings. Any Snllpr nr t^na'tt moving^rolaied 
damage lo the Property shall be repaired at Seller s expend 
(b) Tho heating cooling, electncal. plumbing <i<)d sonnklor systems ann fixtures and the appliances anc fireplaces will be 
in working order and fit lor thoir intended purposes. 
(c) the roof and foundation shall bo free of leaks Known to Seller. 
(d) any prrvate wot! or septic tank serving the Property shall have *pui«cat>ie permits, ano shall be in Y/orXing order and 
tit for its intended purpose; and 
(e) the Property and improvements, including the lancscapmg. wili bo in the same general condition as tney were on the 
aate of Acceptance. 
11. WALKTHROUGH INSPECTION. Oofore Setttenwni. Buywi fnity, upon reasonable notice ana at a reasonable time 
conduct a 'walk-through- inspection of tho Properly to determine only thai me Property »c "a«, represented.- meaning that tne 
items referenced in Sections 1.1, 8.4 and 10.2 ("the items") "are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed, andm the 
warranted condition If the items are not as represented. Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or reparr the items or. 
with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same The failure to 
conduct a walk-through inspection or to clmm that an item ie not as reprocontcd, shall not constitute a waiver by Buy«r ul tire 
nght to receive, on the date gf possesion, the items as represented. 
12- CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until tne dale of Closing, none of 
the following shaft occur without the prior wntton consent of Buyer (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made, (b) 
no new leases sliall be entered into, (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property stvttl be made or undertaken, 
and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. 11 Buyer or Sel'e' is a ccporafcon. partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or other 
entity, The parson executing this Contract on itc behnif warrants hi* or her authouiy lu du so and to bind Buy-*r and Seller 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached cxlubilb. and Seller Disclosures 
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes znd replaces any and all prior negotiations representations 
warranties, understandings or contracts buiwei*rt ihe parties This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement 
of the parties , 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree thai any dispute. a iw tg prior to or after Closing, retatej to mis Contract 
( ) SHALL [j(] MAY (upon rnutual agreement of the parties) first bfc Submitted to mediation If the parties acree to mediation 
the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the paittes each pany 
agrees to bear its own costs of mediation It mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under thn, Coniruri 
shall apply. Noth.ng in this Section 1S shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation 
16. DEFAULT, if Buyer defaults, Seller may elect onher to retain the Earnest Money Dvposit .is iiqutoated damages or to 
•Kturn it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce tin* Contract or pirsue other remedies available at law If Seller defaults m 
.addition to return of me Earnest Money Deposit Quyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest Money 
Deposit as Mqutdated carnages, or niay *ue 5vli*r to specifically enforce thr, Contract or pursue other remf-dios available
 tit 
iw II Buyer clot.'* to 4ornpj hquidaien dninaoes Seller <igrep^ to ujy the ii:juid«ned damages to Buyer upon demand u •*., 
jgreed that denial of u Loan App'^ation madr/7>> thcAJwyei" «•> not A dcUutt and is governed hy Section 2 3(h) 
)*Mr.r 4 <if ft |I.IKI-N Seller"* I n i t i a l / / y ( y f P H U ' / / Jj / / llim-r'* h>iU^U fy ' & . i>Mtr J_/„7// / 
5 c Wifi <^* 
MVv (VGA \^AM Put., 
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
17.1 In Action* to Errforce tn>a Contract, in 'n * evpni of iitrqono- or ^mrjing arbitration to cr»fu;ce mis Conlraci th 
provaiiing parly snail be jpntrtlod to costs ond rea^onamo .v.iurnpy fo«>^  Attorney in^s r.haP no' he av/arded for participation i 
mediation unuer Section ?£. 
17.2 In Interpleader Actions. If ?. ;}/<nop.\| Orokor huld»r,<] the Earnest Money Deposit is required Dy taw to t>K". a 
interpleader action m court to resolve a dispute -JJQ\ that Deoosd. Buyu und Soiler authors ihar pnntipai ba-ker to draw fro« 
that Deposit an amount neenssary to advance the court ousts needed to bring that interpleader action Tne amount o-f th< 
Deposrt remaining alter advancing those costs srvni he interpleaded into cwurt E3uyur and Seltet 'urther agree that whichever 
of them »s found lo be m default may bo ordered lo pay .jny reasonable attorney lees, or addition^ court edsty. incurred by thi 
principal brokor :n bringing th'n action, unless the court hndo that there wa$ lault un the pan of tht- principal broker or tos or h<? 
agent that would make such'an awara of attorney tecs and costs unjust 
18. NOTICES. Excep! as provided ;n Section z:). an nonces requited unoer this Contract must be. (a) m anting; (b) signpr 
by the party giving notice: and (0 received by the othe* party or the other party's agent no later rhan the- applicable date 
referenced in this Contract 
19. ABROGATION. Except tor the provisions of Sections 15 and !7 1 and ezptetts warranties mude in rats Contract, Ihc 
provisions of this Contract shall not apply after C'osmg 
20. RISK OF LOSS. AH risk of loss to the Property not causod by Seller or Buyer, including physical damage or destruction 
to the Property or its improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear a/id tear and loss caused by a taking m eminent 
domain, shall be borne by Seller until Seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contiact. Extensions must Do 
agreed to in writing ny at) parties. Unioss otherwise explicitly slated in this Contract, (a) performance under each Section of 
this Contract which references a date shall absolutely bo required by 0:00 PM Mountain Timo on tnc slated (fate: and (b) the 
term "days* shall moan calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the evgnt which triggers the taming 
requirement (i.e.. Accoptance, receipt of the Seller Disclosures, olc.;. Performance dates and times referenced herein snail 
not be binding uoon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed 
to m writing by such non-party. 
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (tax) transmission of a signed copy of thts Contract, any 
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed tax shaU be tne same as driven/ of an original. This Q^nirgtCl 
ami any *rtn>nd«i ana eountorofforu moy be ^>:6cutwJ 
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs whan Suiter or Buyer, responding to an offer or cuunteroffet of trie other (a) signs 
the otter or counteroffer whe(e noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other parly's 
agont that the otter or counteroffer has been signed as required 
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES* Buyer and Sftttur agiee ihut the following deaolines shall apply to this Contract: 
(a) Application Deadline No later than Is calendar days after Acceptance. 
(to) Seller Disclosure Deadline No lat*r than sO calendar days afttr Acceptance, 
(e) Buyer Cancellation Deadline No later than ju <£ calendar days after Buyer's receipt of all of the 
Seller Disclosures. 
(d) Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline ^J5„ calendar daya rter thp Buyer Cancellation Deadline. 
(e) Settlement Deadline ' y^L^^i 1 J /VfpDATE) 
25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Ruyer offers to purchase the Property on t h ^ h c v ? lermsand conditions It 
Softer does not accept this ofler by. ^ P"^>4 1 A W \£\ P M Mountain Tims = 9 S S g 5 c S S 5 ^ ^ 19 ^?""3-
this offer shall lapse, and I he (Brokerage snail return the Earnest Money Deposit to Bu, . _ . , 
(Bt/yer's Signature;} y (Offer Date) (Buy^T^ Signature) (OUor Daip) 
Tl«*' later of tho above OJitr* O.MCt **M< bo referred to «s trw "Otter R«i#*cnce Out* -
(Buyurs'Names) (PLEASE PRINT) / / iNiV.ir* AOcJross) (Pliunr) 
V\\%v * »Th p.iui- Seller'* lnlii.»U / f / {)'iW 'P ^ I r~ ! i u > r r ' N l»itl»'l> ^ ? / £ , t>ulv / / //_?7 
' ' ^>L //7/f? 
Mtw6/90 
ACCEPT ANCE/C0UNTF.R0FFEP/REJECTION 
CHeCK ONE: 
(X^ACCEPTANCE OF OFFcR TO PURCHASE &M»er Acceu's the forp'jo,nn nftnr on ^e t^ rrnc r.nc car\W<*** specified 
anove 
i ] COUNTEROFFER]/golfer presents lor Buyers Acceptance tne terms of Buyer's ofier subject 10 ih(: exceptions o? 
' '"jrcatipw as^/ct fea in the attached ADDENDUM NO 
4o&£J*J&^^ (SeOsFsStgnature) 1 (Date) (limp) (Sellers Signature) (Dale; (Time; 
(SeWers* Names) (PLEASE PWNT) (Notice Address) (Phone 
[ ] REJECTION: Seder Rejects the foregotrg off»r 
(Seer's Signature) (Date) rTime) (Sellers Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State law requires Broker to furnish Buyvr and Seller with copies of this Contract beanng all signatures (Ffl m applicable 
section below) 
A I acknowledge receipt 0! & final copy of tne foroyoing Contract bearing all signatures: 
Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Buyers Signature) (Dcto) 
Ceiled Signature) (Oute) (Seller's Stgnature) (Date) 
\ 1 personally caused a final copy of tne :OTOQO«»X} Contract bearing all Signatures to be [ ] faxed { ] malted [ ] hand 
.elivered on . . 19 . postage prepaid, to the [ } Seller [ } Buyer 
Sent/Defcvered by ^specify) _
 m 
THtS PORM APPROVED 8Y THE UTAH SEAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OP TH6 UTAH ATTORNC? GENERAL. 
SFFECT1VH JUME 1?, 199$. n REPLACES ANO SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS 0 * TKfS POftM 
t'uuc <% ol c> pagvN Seller's IttthnN D.ilv M I I M I \ In in. iU \)j\K 
APPENDIX "F" 
Judgment, Copeland v. Movie, entered March 
17, 1998 (R. 204A-205A) 
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER 
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
394 West 400 North 
Moab,Utah 84532 
Telephone: (801)259-7321 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
GEORGE & SHARON 
COPELAND, 
I JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Civil No. 9707-79* 
NELSON MOYLE, 
Judge Anderson 
Defendant. 
The Court having made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the case, 
now hereby awards 
JUDGMENT, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Nelson Moyle as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the action. In this 
regard, counsel for the plaintiffs is directed to submit an Affidavit of costs and attorneys fees 
following the hearing for determination of plaintiffs' damages, and provide the same to counsel 
for the defendant for review prior to determination by the Court 
2. Interest on any amount of damages found to have been caused by defendant's 
breach of the contract at the legal rate of 10% for contracts not specifying a rate of interest, from 
January 13,1997 to March 3,1998. See, Sec. 15-1-1, U.CA. 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
FILED MAR 1 7 1998 
•7, -H^to •&< 
3. Interest on the total Judgment as calculated above at the rate of 0.468% (7.468 4 
5%T^H»uailt^©e745=*:4rU.CA.) from March 3,1998, until paid. 
Dated this iZciay of _ ^ 1 9 9 8 . 
BY THE COURT 
»MJs„_ 
JORABLE LYLE ANDERSON 
Dfetfict Court Judge 
Approved as to Form & Content 
Leslie Slaugh 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Mailing Certificate 
This is to certify that true and correct copies of Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of fact 
Conclusions of Law and Judgments in Civil 9707-77 & 9707-96 were mailed, postage prepaid to 
defendant's counsel, LESLIE SLAUGH, P.O. Box pASTTrovo, Uteh) 84603. 
3fa ft? 
APPENDIX "G" 
Order, Canyon Country Realty v. Moyle. 
entered May 6, 1998 (R. 126B-127B) 
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER 
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
394 West 400 North 
Moab,Utah 84532 
Telephone: (801)259-7321 SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT Grand County, Utah 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT F1LED MAY - 6 1998 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
CANYON COUNTRY REALTY, and 
COLDWELL BANKER/ARCHES 
REALTY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NELSON MOYLE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 9707-96 
Judge Anderson 
On March 17, 1998, the Court entered a Judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and 
directed plaintiffs counsel to submit an Affidavit in support of an award of costs and 
attorneys' fees. The Affidavit was submitted on April 20,1998. The time having passed 
for a response or objection to the request for costs and fees, and the amounts set forth in 
the Affidavit of plaintiffs' counsel appearing reasonable and necessarily incurred, good 
cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the Judgment in the above entitled case, made 
and entered on March 17, 1998, shall include costs of $465.05 and attorneys' fees of 
$3,105. The total Judgment as of March 17, 1998, is therefore $16,095.05, which 
amount shall accrue interest at 7.468% until paid. 
Dated th is^day of P ^ \ , 1998. 
By The Court 
4^— Tb^Honorable Lyle R. Anderson 
District Court Judge 
APPENDIX "H" 
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, 
Copeland v. Moyle. entered August 5, 1998 
(R. 225A-233A) 
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER 
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
394 West 400 North 
Moab,Utah 84532 
Telephone: (801)259-7321 
FILED AU6 - 5 1998 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
GEORGE & SHARON COPELAND, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NELSON MOYLE, 
Defendant. 
Findings of Fact & 
Conclusions of Law 
Civil No. 9707-77 
Judge Anderson 
On March 17, 1998, the Court granted plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the claim that defendant had breached a Real Estate Purchase Contract for land and 
improvement located at 590 North 500 West in Moab, Grand County, Utah. 
On July 13, 1998, after allowance for further discovery by all parties, a hearing 
was held to determine the nature and extent of the Copelands' damages, if any, arising 
from the breach of contract. All parties were present represented by counsel of record. 
The plaintiffs offered several alternative theories for recovery including benefit of the 
bargain, lost business profits, lost personal income and other consequential damages. 
During the course of the hearing, the plaintiffs elected to pursue only the benefit of the 
bargain claim for damages. Based on the sworn testimony, exhibits offered and accepted 
and argument of counsel, the Court hereby makes and enters the following: 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant Nelson Moyle breached a contract with the plaintiffs for the 
sale of real property and improvements located at 590 North 500 West in Moab, Grand 
County, Utah. 
2. The Court finds that the property and assets purchased by the plaintiffs is 
limited to that specifically set forth in the Real Estate Purchase Contract that was 
executed by the parties. 
3. In this regard, the Court finds that the existing telephone lines at the time 
of the purchase were not intended to be purchased by the plaintiffs, were not intended to 
be sold by the defendant and were not included in the sale. 
4. Randy Day is a long-time real estate broker and agent in Moab, and acted 
as the selling agent for Mr. Moyle in the subject transaction. 
5. The Court received competent evidence from Mr. Day based on adequate 
foundation that the optimum fair market value of the subject property at the time of the 
transaction between the parties was $250,000. 
6. However, the damages recoverable by the plaintiffs based on benefit of the 
bargain must be limited to the value of the property actually purchased. 
7. The defendant took the position that the existing telephone lines were 
critical to the sale and held significant value. 
8. The Court finds that the telephone lines which were not included in the 
sale had some value to the property, and were important to the continuity of the bed and 
breakfast business which the plaintiffs intended to continue after the sale. 
9. The Court further finds however, that defendant the had little or nothing to 
gain by keeping the existing phone lines. 
10. Based on all of the testimony, exhibits and other evidence offered in the 
case, the Court finds that the fair market value of the property and assets purchased by 
the plaintiffs, which is limited to that specifically set forth in the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract was $235,000. 
11. The plaintiffs are entitled to damages based on the benefit of the bargain 
from the contract which defendant breached in the amount of $50,000. In this case, the 
benefit of the bargain is the difference between the fair market value of the property at 
the time of sale as determined above, and the sales price agreed to by the defendant in the 
real estate purchase contract. (FMV $235,000 - Sales Price $185,000 = $50,000.) 
12. The plaintiffs are further entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys 
fees and costs incurred in the case. Plaintiff submitted an Affidavit of costs and fees 
through June 17, 1998, and requested an opportunity to supplement the Affidavit for 
more recent work which was granted. Defendant was given an opportunity to examine 
plaintiffs' counsel with respect to the fee affidavit and declined. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court hereby makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has previously ruled as a matter of law that the defendant 
breached a Real Estate Purchase Contract with the plaintiffs. 
2. An appropriate measure of damages for the breach of a real estate contract 
is that known as "benefit of the bargain," which is equal to the difference between the fan-
market value of the property at the time of sale and the agreed upon purchase price. 
3. On January 13, 1997, the date of the transaction, the fair market value of 
the property and assets purchased by the plaintiffs, which property is specifically limited 
to that set forth in the Real Estate Purchase Contract was $235,000. 
4. Since the contractual sales price was $185,000, the plaintiffs are entitled to 
a Judgment based on benefit of the bargain in the amount of $50,000. 
5. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of the reasonable costs and attorneys 
fees incurred in the case in the amount of $5,285.98. 
Dated thisJS^bay of /jL/jl/Zf' 1998. 
BY THE COURT 
LONORABLE 
Court Judge 
Approved as to Form & Content 
Leslie Slaugh 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Mailing Certificate 
This is to certify that true and correct copies of Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and (Revised) Affidavit of Attornys Fees and were 
mailed, postage prepaid to defendant's counsel JUffSLIE SLAUGH, P.O. Box 1248, 
Provo, Utah 84603. ^^^>Sy^Zs 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVE RUSSELL 
State of Utah ) 
) ss 
Grand County ) 
Steve Russell, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. 
2. In June, 1997,1 was retained by george & Sharon Copeland to represent her them 
in a real estate matter concerning the purchase of a bed & breakfast property- at 590 North 500 
West in Moab. 
3. On January 29, 1998, the Court entered a Judgment for Attorneys' Fees incurred 
through August 13, 1997. Time and expenses related to previously awarded fees have not been 
included here. 
4. During the course of my representation I performed the services set forth below. 
8/18 Settlement Meeting w/ Moyle/Gubler 1.75 
Motion to alter measure of damages 
from specific performance to 
benefit of bargain; Affidavits 
of Kingsley & Lewis 2.2 
8/19 
8/20 
8/28 
toll/11 
11/8 
11/25 
11/28 
12/15 
12/31 
1/6 
Finalize above pleadings & file 
Phone Conference - Gubler; Kingsley 
& Lewis re: settlement position 
Request for Atty fees; Notice of 
Appearance 
various T.C. (several) w/ clients & Gubler 
Settlement negotiation; discovery 
deposition scheduling 
Deposition Notice 
Notice of depositions 
Reschedule depos 
2nd Discovery Requests 
Notice to Submit Atty Fee matter for 
decision; Notice of depo 
Mtg. at Copelands' re. depositions 
Draft Discover)' Responses 
.85 
.75 
.5 
2.0 
.35 
.5 
.25 
1.6 
1.0 
1.5 
2.65 
1/9 Prep for Moyle deposition 1.0 
1/11 prep for Moyle deposition 2.25 
1/13 Prepare for depos of George & 
Sharon Copeland 1.0 
1/14 Depositions of Nelson Moyle; Kelly 
Stelter; George & Sharon 7.75 
1/17 Draft request for execution of 
Judgment .5 
1/27 Letter to Gubler w/ Discovery Requests 
from Deposition .7 
2/13 Begin Draft of Reply to Motion for Summary 
Judgment 3.15 
2/23 Resp. to Defendant's Motion for Summary Jdmt; 
Affidavits of Randy Day & George 
Copeland 2.75 
3/3 Prepare for and attend Hearing on Cross-Motions 
for Summary Judgment 3.25 
3/4 Draft Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
& Judgment 1.2 
3/27 T.C. Christina Triplett re: damage claims .75 
702-789-2196; 856-1748 
4570 China Rose Circle, Reno, NV 89502 
5/1 Notice of Hearing .25 
5/18 Review & Work on Responses to Plaintiffs 
Discovery; Conf. w/Clients; Draft Third 
Discovery Requests & Requests for Admission 3.1 
6/7 Mtg. w/ Copelands at Peach Tree; Review responses 
to discovery and responsive documents; 
revisions and additions to both 1.4 
6/9 Final on Pltf s Responses to Discovery Requests 
Review & Confirm w/ clients 2.65 
6/17 Mtg. w/ Copelands; Draft Responses to Discovery 
From Moyle re: 7/13 hearing 1.9 
7/10 Mtg. w/ Suzanne Lewis & Randy Day re: 
review of file and preparation for hearing 1.0 
7/13/1998 Mtg.. w/ Clients to prepare for hearing; 
Hearing before Judge Anderson 3.4 
5. My usual billing rate for such services is $100, which is reasonable and 
consistent, if not below, the market rate. 
6. The Court and defense counsel have requested that I attempt to differentiate time 
spent with regard to the Copelands' benefit of the bargain claim for damages, and the alternate 
claims raised at the hearing on July 13, 1998. I made no attempt to do that during the course of 
the action, and, aside from pure speculation, such a differentiation is impossible now. The 
Copelands' primary claim has always been based on benefit of the bargain, the other damage 
options being subsets which the Copelands put together from their own records. 
7. Though I do not believe a reduction in the fee request is necessarily warranted, I 
would not object to a reduction in the amount of $500, which is more than sufficient to cover the 
concern raised by defense counsel. 
8. Total time spent on the case through June 17, 1998, was 53.9 hours ($5,390). 
Costs include Deposition Expense $289.23; Copies $53.05; Long-Distance Phone $27.20; and 
Postage $13.25. Total: $5,785.98. (Total with suggested reduction $5,285.98) 
9. The foregoing charges were reasonable and necessarily incurred in the 
representation of George & Sharon Copeland. 
Dated this Z^day of iTuW , 1998. 
S ^ 
Steve Russell 
On the Jjf day of S^Uiij , 1998, personally appeared before me Steve 
Russell, who stated that he had read the^oregoing Affidavit and that the information contained 
therein is true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief. Steve Russell signed the 
Affidavit in my presence. 
GRAND COUNTY I AH &JUSIICF T N i t R 
Steve Russell, ^ttorne\ (LSB#2831; 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
394 West 400 North 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone (801)259-7321 
c e \ / F M " 'RICTCOi 
mtv Utnv 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT*<LED " ^ * ? 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
GEORGE & SHARON 
COPELAND, 
Plaintiffs, 
NELSON MOYLE, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9707-?? 
Judge Anderson 
The Court having made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the case, 
now hereby awards 
JUDGMENT, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Nelson Movie as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred m the action In this 
regard, counsel for the plambfts is directed to submit an Affidavit of costs and attorne\ s fees 
following the heanng for determmabon of plainbffs' damages, and provide the same to counsel 
for the defendant for review prior to determmabon by the Court 
2. Interest on any amount of damages found to have been caused by defendant's 
breach of the contract at the legal rate of 10°o for contracts not specifying a rate of interest fiom 
Januan H 1997 to March 3,1998 See, ^ 15-1-1, U CM 
3. Interest on tho total Jud^nvnt as calculated above at the rate of 9.468% (7 468 + 
2%, pursuant to Sec 15-1-4, UC A) from March \ i°98, until paid. 
Dated this day of > < _ > 1Q98. 
BY THE C O U R T 
THE HONORABLE LYLE ANDERSON 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form & Content 
Leslie Slaugh 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Mailing Certificate 
This is to certify that true and correct copies of Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgments in Civil 9707-77 & 9707-96 w_ere mailed, postage prepaid to 
defendant's counsel, LESLIE SLAUGH, P.O. Box 1248^PrcrcCytah,84603. 
APPENDIX "I" 
Judgment, Copeland v. Movie, entered August 
5, 1998 (R. 234A-235A) 
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER 
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
394 West 400 North 
Moab, Utah 84532 SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Telephone: (801 )259-7321 Grand County, Utah 
FILED AUG - 5 1998 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
SHARON & GEORGE COPELAND, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NELSON MOYLE, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9707-77 
Judge Anderson 
On March 17, 1998, the Court granted plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
based on breach of contract and entered a Judgment in plaintiffs5 favor and against the 
defendant. See, copy attached. 
On July 13, 1998, the Court held a hearing specifically to determine the nature 
and extent of plaintiffs' damages. 
The Court having made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
in the case, now hereby awards 
JUDGMENT, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Nelson Moyle 
as follows: 
1. The amount of $50,000 as damages for breach of the real estate contract 
based on benefit of the bargain. 
- i -Interest on that amount at tho legal rate of 10% for conliacls nut ^Irg — 
specifying f\ rsftp. nf intprprf, frnm Tnmimy I I \W i In Marr.h S HWK m the, miumnl f f 
«$5,68<l.93-
3. Costs and attorneys fees of $5,285.98 
4. Interest at the legal rate of 7.468% on the total Judgment of $66,970.91 -
from March 4- 1998, until paid. {Tho mtoroot accrued ac of July 13j 1998 10 in the 
mnuunluf $1,247.40:) *-"S^ 
Dated this is 1998. 
BY THE COURT 
[ONORABLE LYLE 
Court Judge 
Approved as to Form & Content 
Leslie Slaugh 
Attorney for the Defendant <w^ 
APPENDIX "J" 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2b-2, 61-2b-3, 61-2b-9 
CHAPTER 2b 
REAL ESTATE APPRAISER 
REGISTRATION AND 
CERTIFICATION 
Section Section 
61-2b-l. Short title. 61-2b-5. Chapter administration. 
61-2b-2. Definitions. 61-2b-6. Duties and powers of division. 
61-2b-3. Registration or certification re- 61-2b-7. Board established — Composi-
quired. tion — Qualifications — 
61-2b-4. Repealed. Terms of office — Expenses. 
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Section 
ber to be used on contracts — 
Surrender of documents upon 
suspension — Inspection of 
documents. 
61-2b-25. Other law unaffected. 
61-2b-26. Principal place of business — 
Display of documents. 
61-2b-27. Professional conduct — Uni-
form standards. 
6 l-2b-28. Enforcement — Investigation — 
Orders — Hearings. 
61-2b-29. Unprofessional conduct. 
61-2b-30. Compliance with Administra-
tive Procedures Act. 
61-2b-31. Disciplinary hearing process. 
61-2b-32. Registration or certification pre-
requisite to suit for compen-
sation. 
61-2b-33. Criminal penalty — Registra,-
tion following conviction. 
61-2b-34. Recordkeeping requirements. 
61-2b-35. Repealed. 
61-2b-36. Contingent fees. 
61-2b-37. Division service fees — Federal 
registry fees. 
61-2b-38. Division to publish roster of ap-
praisers. 
61-2b-39. Certificate of Standing. 
61-2b-40. Continuing education require-
ments. 
61-2b-41. Consultation reports — Restric-
tions on use of terms. 
This chapter is known as the "Real Estate Appraiser Registration and 
Certification Act." 
History: C. 1953, 61-2b-l, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 212, § 5. 
Section 
61-2b-8. 
61-2b-9. 
61-2b-10. 
61-2b-ll. 
61-2b-12. 
61-2b-13. 
61-2b-14. 
61-2b-15. 
61-2b-15.5. 
61-2b-16. 
61-2b-17. 
61-2b-18. 
61-2b-19. 
61-2b-20. 
61-2b-21. 
61-2b-22. 
61-2b-23. 
61-2b-24. 
61-2b-l. 
Duties of board. 
Application for registration or 
certification. 
State-registered appraiser — 
Authority and qualifications. 
Curriculum to be determined by 
board. 
Repealed. 
Senior appraiser — State-certi-
fied appraisers — Authority. 
State-certified residential ap-
praisers. 
State-certified general ap-
praiser — Application for cer-
tification. 
Senior appraisers. 
Certification requirements. 
State appraisers — Restrictions 
on use of term — Conduct 
prohibited. 
Application for certification. 
Expiration of registration or 
certification. 
Renewal of registration or certi-
fication. 
Denial of registration or certifi-
cation. 
Registration or certification re-
quirements for nonresidents 
— Temporary permits. 
Reciprocal licensing. 
Registration or certification 
documents — Assigned num-
Short title. 
61-2b-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) (a) "Appraisal" means an unbiased analysis, opinion, or conclusion 
relating to the nature, quahty, value, or utility of specified interests 
in, or aspects of, identified real estate or identified real property. 
(b) Appraisals shall be classified by the nature of the assignment as 
a valuation appraisal, an analysis assignment, or a review assign-
ment in accordance with the following definitions: 
(i) "Valuation appraisal" means an unbiased analysis, opinion, 
or conclusion that estimates the value of an identified parcel of 
real estate or identified real property at a particular point in time, 
(ii) "Analysis assignment" means an unbiased analysis, opin-
ion, or conclusion that relates to the nature, quahty, or utility of 
identified real estate or identified real property. 
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(iii) "Review assignment" means an unbiased analysis, opin-
ion, or conclusion that forms an opinion as to the adequacy and 
appropriateness of a valuation appraisal or an analysis assign-
ment. 
(2) "Appraisal Foundation" means the Appraisal Foundation that was 
incorporated as an Illinois not-for-profit corporation on November 30, 
1987. 
(3) (a) "Appraisal report" means any communication, written or oral, of 
an appraisal. 
(b) An appraisal report shall be classified by the nature of the 
assignment as a valuation report, analysis report, or review report in 
accordance with the definitions provided in Subsection (l)(b). 
(c) The testimony of a person relating to the person's analyses, 
conclusions, or opinions concerning identified real estate or identified 
real property is considered to be an oral appraisal report. 
(4) "Board" means the Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certifi-
cation Board that is estabUshed under this chapter to provide technical 
assistance and make recommendations to the division and perform certain 
ancillary functions. 
(5) "Certified appraisal report" means a written or oral appraisal report 
that is certified as such by a state-certified general appraiser or state-
certified residential appraiser. The certification of an appraisal report by a 
state-certified real estate appraiser represents to the public that the 
appraisal report meets the appraisal standards estabUshed under this 
chapter. 
(6) (a) (i) "Consultation service" means an engagement to provide a 
real estate valuation service analysis, opinion, conclusion, or 
other service that does not faU within the definition of appraisal, 
(ii) "Consultation service" does not mean a valuation appraisal, 
analysis assignment, or review assignment as provided in Sub-
section (l)(b). 
(b) Regardless of the intention of the client or employer, if a person 
prepares an unbiased analysis, opinion, or conclusion, the analysis, 
opinion, or conclusion is considered to be an appraisal and not a 
consultation service. 
(7) "Contingent fee" means a fee or other form of compensation, pay-
ment of which is dependent on or conditioned by: 
(a) the reporting of a predetermined analysis, opinion, or conclu-
sion by the person performing the analysis, opinion, or conclusion; or 
(b) achieving a result specified by the person requesting the analy-
sis, opinion, or conclusion. 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Real Estate of the Department of 
Commerce. 
(9) "FederaUy related transaction" means any real estate related trans-
action which is required by federal law or by federal regulation to be 
supported by an appraisal prepared by a state certified appraiser. 
(10) "Real estate" means an identified parcel or tract of land including 
improvements if any. 
(11) "Real estate appraisal activity" means the act or process of making 
an appraisal of real estate or real property and preparing an appraisal 
report. 
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(12) "Real estate related transaction" means: 
(a) the sale, lease, purchase, investment in, or exchange of real 
property or an interest in real property, or the financing of such a 
transaction; 
(b) the refinancing of real property or an interest in real property; 
or 
(c) the use of real property or an interest in real property as 
security for a loan or investment, including mortgage-backed securi-
ties. 
(13) "Real property" means one or more defined interests, benefits, or 
rights inherent in the ownership of real estate. 
(14) "Senior appraiser" means a person grandfathered under this 
chapter who holds a current, valid state certification issued to the person 
based on the person's experience or designation as a member in good 
standing in an appraisal organization that is a member of the Appraisal 
Foundation. 
(15) "State-certified general appraiser" means a person who holds a 
current, valid certification as a state-certified general appraiser issued to 
him under the provisions of this chapter. The state-certified general 
appraiser classification consists of those persons who meet the require-
ments for certification relating to the appraisal of all types of real estate. 
(16) "State-certified residential appraiser" means a person who holds a 
current, valid certification as a state-certified residential real estate 
appraiser issued to him under the provisions of this chapter. The state-
certified residential appraiser classification consists of those persons who 
meet the requirements for certification that relate to the appraisal of 
residential real estate in federally related transactions. 
(17) "State-registered appraiser" means a person who holds a current, 
valid state registration as a real estate appraiser issued to him under the 
provisions of this chapter. The state-registered appraiser classification 
consists of those persons who meet the requirements for registration that 
relate to the appraisal of all types of real estate in transactions that are 
not federally related transactions. 
(18) "Unbiased analysis, opinion, or conclusion" means an analysis, 
opinion, or conclusion relating to the nature, quality, value, or utility or 
identified real estate or identified real property that is prepared by a 
person who is employed or retained to act, or would be perceived by third 
parties or the public as acting, as a disinterested third party in rendering 
the analysis, opinion, or conclusion. 
History: C. 1953, 61-2b-2, enacted by L. Severability Clauses. — Laws 1991, ch. 
1990, ch. 212, § 6; 1991, ch. 245, § 2; 1996, 245, which amended several sections through-
ch. 131, § 1. out this chapter, provides in § 23: "If the pro-
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- visions of tins act do not comply with the 
ment, effective April 29, 1996, deleted former provisions of the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Subsections (8) and (14) denning independent Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 as de-
and specialized appraisal services; added Sub- termined by the Appraisal Subcommittee of the 
sections (6), (7), and (18) and redesignated the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
other subsections accordingly; subdivided Sub- Council, the remainder of this act shall be given 
sections (1) and (3); inserted "unbiased" effect without the invalid provisions." The Fi-
throughout Subsection (1); in Subsection (14) nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
deleted "certified" before "Senior"; and made forcement Act of 1989 amended the Federal 
stylistic and related changes. Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq. 
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61-2b-3. Registration or certification required. 
(1) It is unlawful for anyone to prepare, for valuable consideration, an 
appraisal, an appraisal report, a certified appraisal report, or perform a 
consultation service relating to real estate or real property in this state 
without first being registered or certified in accordance with the provisions of 
this chapter. 
(2) This section does not apply to: 
(a) a real estate broker or sales agent as defined by Section 61-2-2 
licensed by this state who, in the ordinary course of his business, gives an 
opinion: 
(i) regarding the value of real estate; 
(ii) to a potential seller or third party recommending a listing price 
of real estate; or 
(hi) to a potential buyer or third party recommending a purchase 
price of real estate; 
(b) an employee of a company who states an opinion of value or prepares 
a report containing value conclusions relating to real estate or real 
property solely for the company's use; 
(c) any official or employee of a government agency while acting solely 
within the scope of his duties, unless otherwise required by Utah law; 
(d) an auditor or accountant who states an opinion of value or prepares 
a report containing value conclusions relating to real estate or real 
property while performing an audit; 
(e) an individual, except an individual who is required to be registered 
or certified under this chapter, who states an opinion about the value of 
property in which he has an ownership interest; 
(f) an individual who states an opinion of value if no consideration is 
paid or agreed to be paid for the opinion and no other party is reasonably 
expected to rely on the individual's appraisal expertise; 
(g) an individual, such as a researcher or a secretary, who does not 
render significant professional assistance, as defined by the board, in 
arriving at a real estate appraisal analysis, opinion, or conclusion; or 
(h) an attorney authorized to practice law in this state who, in the 
course of his practice, utilizes an appraisal report governed by this chapter 
or who states an opinion of the value of real estate. 
(3) No opinion of value or report containing value conclusions exempt under 
Subsection (2) may be referred to as an appraisal. 
History: C. 1953, 61-2b-3, enacted by L. ment, effective April 29, 1996, inserted "for 
1990, ch. 212, § 7; 1991, ch. 245, § 3; 1996, valuable consideration" and "or perform a con-
ch. 131, § 2. sultation service" in Subsection (1) and made 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability. mg a unit method of appraisal, the appraiser 
There was no error in the admission of the did not identify specific parcels of real property 
testimony and appraisal of an unregistered and in his report as contemplated by this section, 
uncertified appraiser made for the sole purpose Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Tax Comm'n ex rel. 
of supporting a utility's request for commission MCI Telecom mum cations Corp., 895 P.2d 825 
action to reduce its tax assessment; m prepar- (Utah 1995). 
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61-2b-9. Application for registration or certification. 
Any individual who prepares or causes to be prepared an appraisal, an 
appraisal report, or a certified appraisal report in this state, in order to 
lawfully engage in such activity in this state, shall: 
(1) make application in writing for registration or certification as 
provided in this chapter in the form as the division may prescribe; and 
(2) become registered or certified under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 61-2b-9, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 212, § 13. 
APPENDIX "K" 
Utah Post-Judgment Interest Rates 
UTAH POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST RATES 
1 Date 
pre 1981 
1981 to May 3, 1993 
May 3, 1993 to Dec. 31, 1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1 1999 
Rate I 
8.0 
12.0 
5.72 
5.61 
9.22 
7.35 
7.45 
7.468 
6.513 1 
APPENDIX "L" 
Memorandum, May 6, 1993, Administrative 
Office of the Courts 
Itmtimstratibe Office of tfje Courts 
Chief Justice Gordon R Hall Ronald W Gibson 
Chairman. Utah Judicial Council State Court Administrator 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: JUDGES OF COURTS OF RECORD 
JUDGES OF COURTS NOT OF RECORD 
ACTIVE SENIOR JUDGES 
COURT COMMISSIONERS 
COURT EXECUTIVES 
CLERKS OF COURT 
AOC ADMINISTRATORS 
AOC FINANCE DIVISION 
FROM: Colin Winchester 
General Counsel or"" 
DATE: May 6, 1993 
RE: S.B. 279 and Post judgment interest rates 
Senate Bill 279, effective May 3, 1993, has amended Utah Code 
Ann. S 15-1-4 to read: 
(1) Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall 
conform to the contract and shall bear the interest rate 
agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in 
the judgment. 
(2) Other judgments shall bear interest at the federal 
post judgment interest rate as of January 1 of each year, 
plus 2%. 
(3) "Federal postjudgment interest rate" means the 
interest rate established for the federal court system 
under 28 U.S.C.Sec 1961, as amended. 
Several questions have arisen regarding the proper application 
of this amendment. First, should the law be applied retroactively? 
Second, is the interest rate on judgments to be readjusted 
annually? Third, what is the currently applicable interest rate? 
After researching both state and federal law and discussing 
the issue with the Office of Legislative Research & General 
Counsel, I have concluded that the law should not be applied 
retroactively. That conclusion is consistent with decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court which have held that, absent express legislative 
intent, a statute which affects substantive rights should not be 
given retroactive effect. Brunver v. Salt' Lake County. 551 P.2d 
521 (Utah 1976). * 
The interest rate for any particular judgment is to be 
determined as of the date of the judgment, and that rate remains 
applicable for the duration of the judgment. While the statute is 
not entirely clear on this point, counsel at the Office of 
Legislative Research & General Counsel assures me that this was the 
intent. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that 
S.B. 279 has been specifically modeled on the federal postjudgment 
interest rate statute, which has been interpreted as allowing for 
only one interest rate for the life of a given judgment. See 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Boniorno. 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1577 
(1990). 
The interest rate which applies to judgments (other than 
judgments based on contracts specifying an interest rate agreed 
upon by the parties) rendered between May 3, 1993 and December 31, 
1993 is 5.72%. 
You will be notified by the AOC each January as to the new 
interest rate. 
